IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO

GENERAL DIVISION

LITTLE PRINTING COMPANY dba CASE NO. 76-178
PIQUA PRINTING CO., JUDGE R.K. WILSON
APPELLANT
 
vs.
 

SAM B. SARVER
APPELLEE
JUDGMENT ENTRY
 

For the reasons stated in the decision rendered and filed herein on November 10, 1976, this Court finds that the decision of the Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, dated May 28, 1976 was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that accordingly, the said Board of Review should have rendered a decision in favor of Appellant when it rendered a decision in favor of Appellee.
 
If is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged by this Court that the decision of the Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, dated May 28, 1976 be and the same is hereby reversed and vacated. And the Court coming now to render the judgement which the Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services ought to have rendered, final judgment is now entered in this Court for the Appellant, and Appellee's claim is therefore denied.
 
It is further ordered that this cause be remanded to the Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, to carry this judgment into effect and for execution; and that the Appellant recover from the Appellee its costs herein expended.
 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO
GENERAL DIVISION

 
LITTLE PRINTING COMPANY NO. 76-178
APPELLANT
 
VS.
 
SAM B. SARVER, ET AL
APPELLEES

D E C I S I O N

WILSON, J.
 
The appellee, Sam B. Sarver, was awarded unemployment benefits for the week ending January 10, 1976. The Appellant, Little Printing Company, seeks a reversal.
 
Appellant has correctly pointed out that the record contradicts some of the findings of fact in the decision dated April 21, 1976; however, the findings of fact are essentially correct.
 
There is no question but that the appellee, Sam B. Sarver, became unemployed because of a labor dispute other than a lockout.
 
The issue in this case is a question of law involving statutory construction of R.C. 4141.29 (D).(l) (a).
 
The claimant was not called back to work after the settlement of a labor dispute because of the employers' loss of business resulting from the strike.
 
P.C. 4141.29 (D)(1)(a) provides in part that "no individual may -- be paid benefits -- for any week -- his unemployment.
 
The above quoted language became effective October 20, 1963.
 
Prior to October 20, 1963, the underlined portion of the law quoted above was from time to time changed by the General Assembly.
 
Between October 30, 1953, and October 10, 1955, the language of the statute was "as long as such labor dispute continues."
 
Between October 10, 1955, and October 16, 1954, the language used was "as long as such labor dispute continues, and thereafter for a reasonable period of time necessary for such factory or establishment to resume normal operations."
 
Between October 16, 1959, and October 20, 1963, the language was the same as that used effective October 30, 1953.
 
Leach vs. Republic Steel Corporation, 170 Ohio St. 221 (1964) involved a construction of the language "and for so long as such labor dispute continues," i.e. the language of the present statute.
 
The Leach case involved claims between the time a strike was terminated by court order and the date of a new union contract. The administrator held in favor of the employees finding them to be entitled to benefits because of "lack of work." The board reversed holding that the unemployment was by reason of a "labor dispute." The board reversed holding that the unemployment was by reason of a "labor dispute." The boards' decision was upheld by all of the courts.
 
The Leach case is in point to the extent that statutory con.....statute. The Leach case involved start up time after a strike. It is not in point on the narrow issue loss of work caused by loss of business resulting from the strike. In both cases some employees were not recalled because there was no work for these employees pending the resumption of full normal operations after a strike.
 
The present law broadened the provisions for labor dispute disqualification over the language used effective October 30, 1953 and the language used effective October 10, 1955. The Present law is the same on the narrow issue in this case as the law was under Leach.
 
Hall vs. American Brake Shoe Company, 13 Ohio Misc. 35 (1965) involved the same statutory language involved here. The decision in Hall is based almost entirely on Leach. The syllabus is in part as follows:
 
"An employee is not entitled to benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act for work Iost because of orders being withdrawn by purchasers of the employer."
 
Abston vs. McCall Printing Comoany, Montgomery County CA 4505, like this case, involved loss of employer business. Unlike this case, Abston vs. McCall did not involve a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the statute.
 
The referee quoted from Cornell vs. Bailey, 163 Ohio St. 50, as follows:
 
"Any employee, who leaves or loses his employment as a direct result of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) --is of whether such employee left his employment as an active participant in such labor dispute or lost his employment involuntarily."
 
Cornell involved non-striking employees' lack of work due a labor dispute-
 
In effect the referee held that the claimant's lack of work was the indirect result of a labor dispute.
 
The transcript reveals no evidence of any intervening cause The only evidence was that the employers' loss of business was a direct result of the labor dispute.
 
It follows that the decision of the board of review was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of evidence.
 
R.K. Wilson, Judge