James Altizer, Appellant-Appellant,
 vs.

Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services,

National Creditors Group, and Administrator, Ohio

Bureau of Employment Services,

Appellees-Appellees.

No. 95APE10-1310
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, FRANKLIN COUNTY
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 951
March 12, 1996, Rendered

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

 COUNSEL

Robert G. Byrom, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stefan J. Schmidt, for appellees Board of Review and Administrator.
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Kevin P. Foley, for appellee National Creditors Group.

 JUDGES

BOWMAN, J. DESHLER and LAZARUS, JJ., concur.
 AUTHOR: BOWMAN

 OPINION

 

 

 
(REGULAR CALENDAR)

 

BOWMAN, J.

 

Appellant, James Altizer ("Altizer"), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that affirmed a decision by the Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services ("OBES"), which found that Altizer was not entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits.

 

Appellant sets forth the following assignments of error:

 

"I. The Common Pleas Court erred and abused its discretion in finding that the document submitted on or about February 16, 1993, by the employer's representative constituted a good and sufficient notice of appeal meeting the strict requirements of law to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the administrative agency to review the initial determination of the Bureau Administrator in favor of the appellant. ***

 

"II. The Common Pleas Court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to find that the decision of the Board of Review was unlawful, unreasonable, andor against the manifest weight of the evidence of record. *** "

 

Altizer was employed by National Creditors Group, Inc.Creditors Service Corporation ("employer") from August 9, 1993 to March 31, 1994, when his employment was terminated by the company president Kathleen Cooley. Altizer was employed in a sales and marketing position and it was his job to bring new accounts into the employer's business. He was paid approximately $ 250 per week, plus commissions, and one-half of his insurance premiums were to be paid by his employer.

 

Due to a bookkeeping error, Altizer's contribution to his insurance premiums were not withheld from his paycheck and, when informed of the problem, Altizer told Cooley to "take it out of my next paycheck." Altizer's next paycheck was apparently substantially less than he anticipated, but there is no evidence as to whether he had anticipated the amount due for past insurance premiums would be withheld over a period of time.

 

At approximately the same time the problem arose over the payment of Altizer's insurance premiums, his employer became dissatisfied with his job performance. Cooley notified Altizer that he would be required to submit log sheets, as were all other employees in sales and marketing, showing which prospective clients had been contacted, the date of contact or meeting, the results of the meeting, and any planned follow-up calls or meetings. Appellant was also presented with a new salary plan and was required to produce one new account per week with a specified total value for new accounts per year. Altizer became enraged and a heated confrontation occurred between Altizer and Cooley, wherein Altizer shouted a torrent of verbal abuse at Cooley in the presence of other employees. Altizer called Cooley names, alleged she stole the company from her estranged husband, and had stolen money from him. Altizer continued to shout at Cooley in a belligerent manner, even after she retreated to her office. Altizer's employment was terminated by letter March 31, 1994.

 

Nancy Peto, the personnel director for the employer, also testified that Altizer contacted some of the employer's clients and falsely stated Cooley was withholding money due to them. As a result, the employer lost one client.

 

Altizer filed an application for unemployment benefits which was initially allowed and that decision was affirmed following a request for reconsideration by the employer. The employer then requested a further hearing with the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review ("board"). Peto appeared at the hearing before the board's hearing examiner on November 17, 1994, but Altizer failed to appear. The hearing examiner determined that Altizer was discharged for just cause and disallowed his claim. Altizer's request for a further appeal before the board was denied.

 

In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding the employer had filed a proper notice of appeal with the board. Although not specifically set out in his assignment of error, appellant also argues that it was error not to allow appellant a further appeal before the board.

 

R.C. 4141.28(I) states various places where a request for reconsideration or appeal may be filed and further states in paragraph (1):

 

"Any timely written notice stating that the interested party desires a review of the previous determination or decision and the reasons therefor, shall be accepted."

 

The notice of the administrator's reconsideration decision sent to the employer states in part:

 

" *** THE APPEAL *** MUST INDICATE THE ITEMS WITH WHICH YOU DISAGREE, THE REASON FOR DISAGREEMENT, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT, NUMBER SHOWN IN ITEM 3 ON THIS FORM, AND THE APPEAL, MUST BE SIGNED BY THE APPELLANT, AND RECEIPT OF CERTIFIED MEDICAL EVIDENCE *** ."

 

On the notice, the following was typed:

 

"6-15-94

 

" ***

 

"AFTER READING YOUR RULES, SINCE WHEN IS INSUBORDINATION 'NOT ' GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION!?

 

"KATHLEEN COOLEY, PRESIDENT"

 

This notice with the typewritten addition was sent to OBES, who accepted it as an appeal.

 

In an appeal provided by statute, the appeal may only be perfected in the manner set forth in that statute. Zier v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp. (1949), 151 Ohio St. 123, 84 N.E.2d 746. In Wolmack v. Bd. of Review (June 22, 1995), 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2574, Franklin App. No. 94APE12-1780, unreported (1995 Opinions 2904, 2908), this court, in reliance on Moore v. Foreacher (1951), 156 Ohio St. 255, 102 N.E.2d 8, stated:

 

" *** [A] party need not conform exactly to the procedures set out by statute in order to perfect an appeal. Rather, a notice of appeal sufficiently invokes the jurisdiction of a reviewing body when there is substantial compliance with statutory requirements. Substantial compliance exists when 'the notice of appeal clearly and without any ambiguity or uncertainty identifies, fully describes and states the substance and effect of the decision from which the appeal is taken.' Moore, at syllabus."

 

R.C. 4141.28(I)(1) does not require any specific form for the notice of appeal but only requires a written notice indicating a desire for review of a previous determination and the reasons for the request. The notice of determination of benefits does require additional information, such as the basis for the disagreement with the board's decision, a social security number, and a signature. The statement filed by Cooley on behalf of the employer minimally complies with these requirements. To hold that precise or specific language is mandated could work a disservice to many claimants who represent themselves before the board. Such a requirement would not be in compliance with the requirements of R.C. 4141.46, which requires the liberal construction of the unemployment compensation laws. Further, the courts may not require one standard for filing a notice of appeal for employers and another standard for employees. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that the employer had filed a proper notice of appeal.

 

Appellant also argues that the hearing examiner's decision denying appellant unemployment compensation should have been set aside. Apparently, in response to the notice from OBES, appellant sent a letter dated December 12, 1994, which states in part:

 

" *** I called the Bureau of Employment Services about the hearing and they told me since I no longer have a claim I did not need to appear. *** "

 

R.C. 4141.28(J)(2) provides in part:

 

" *** If the other party [Altizer] fails to appear at the hearing, the referee or the board shall proceed with the hearing and shall issue a decision without further hearing, provided that the referee or board shall vacate the decision upon a showing that due notice of the hearing was not mailed to such party's last known address or good cause for his failure to appear is shown to the referee or the board within fourteen days after the hearing date."

 

Appellant does not state in the letter that he failed to receive the notice of the hearing before the board, and the only reasonable interpretation of his letter is that he did receive such notice as he states he "called *** about the hearing" and, after talking to an unidentified employee of OBES, decided not to appear. Thus, appellant was provided with a notice and opportunity for a hearing. Whether or not appellant was given good advice by the unidentified OBES employee, his failure to appear at the November 17, 1994 hearing was his own decision and does not constitute good cause so as to require a new hearing before the hearing examiner. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

 

In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the decision of the board denying his claim for unemployment compensation is against the weight of the evidence. The criteria for determining whether an employee is entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits is set forth in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2), which provides:

 

"(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may *** be paid benefits under the following conditions:

 

" ***

 

"(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that:

 

"(a) He *** has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work *** ."

 

Thus, the issue to be determined by the board is whether the employer had just cause to terminate Altizer's employment. In Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587, 19 Ohio B. Rep. 12, the Ohio Supreme Court quoted with approval this court's decision in Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 10, 335 N.E.2d 751:

 

" *** 'There is, of course, not a slide-rule definition of just cause. Essentially, each case must be considered upon its particular merits. Traditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.' *** "

 

Therefore, whether just cause exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case and a determination of those facts is within the province of the board. The standard for review by the common pleas court of a decision by the board is set forth in R.C. 4141.28(O), which provides:

 

" *** If the court finds that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse and vacate such decision or it may modify such decision and enter final judgment in accordance with such modification; otherwise such court shall affirm such decision. *** "

 

In Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 159, 161-162, 463 N.E.2d 1280, this court stated:

 

"The resolution of purely factual questions is for the board of review and its referees as triers of the facts. *** The role of the court of common pleas, upon an appeal based on factual grounds, is limited to determining whether the board's decision is supported by evidence in the record. *** The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board; it may not reverse simply because it interprets the evidence differently than did the board. *** Because the statutory standards of review is couched in terms of manifest weight of the evidence, a decision of the board supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the controversy will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. ***

 

"The role of an appellate court, in reviewing a determination of a court of common pleas on manifest weight of the evidence on appeal from the board, is different. The function of the court of common pleas, in determining whether the board's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, necessarily involves the exercise of sound discretion. Accordingly, an order of the court of common pleas based upon a determination of the manifest weight of the evidence, may be reversed only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion. *** In this context, the meaning of the term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies a decision without a reasonable basis, one which is clearly wrong."

 

A review of the evidence presented to the board shows that Altizer engaged in behavior which could only be characterized as insubordinate. The remarks made by Altizer to the company president, in the presence of numerous employees, were demeaning, sexist and abusive. Further, when Cooley attempted to enter her office, Altizer followed, continuing his belligerent and abusive shouting. It is not unreasonable to find such conduct is just cause to discharge an employee and such a finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the decision of the board. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.

 

For the foregoing reasons, appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 

Judgment affirmed.

 

DESHLER and LAZARUS, JJ., concur.

 DISPOSITION
 

Judgment affirmed.