IN RE CLAIM OF: GEORGE G.
MAY, Appellee
vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW, ALBERT G.
GILES, Administrator, Appellant
C.A. No. 9406
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, SUMMIT
COUNTY
Slip Opinion
January 9, 1980
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE
COMMON PLEAS COURT SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO, CASE NO. 78 8 1762
COUNSEL
Ray L. Weber, Attorney at Law, for
Appellee
William J. Brown, Attorney General, for Appellant
JUDGES
VICTOR, P.J., MAHONEY, J., HUNSICKER, J., CONCUR (Hunsicker, J.,
retired Judge of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment pursuant to Article IV, § 6(C), Constitution).
AUTHOR: VICTOR
OPINION
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard November 26, 1979, upon the record in the
trial court, including the transcript of proceedings, and the
briefs. It was argued by counsel for the parties and submitted to
the court. We have reviewed each assignment of error and make the
following disposition:
VICTOR, P.J.
This appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County
concerns a claim for the payment of unemployment compensation
benefits.
The claimant, May, after being laid off from his job at Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company filed an application for unemployment
compensation with respect to a benefit year commencing November 6,
1977. His first claim for benefits for the week ending November 12,
1977, was allowed as his waiting week. He continued to file claims
with respect to the weeks ending November 26, 1977, through
February 25, 1978, and received benefits of $ 147.00 for each of
those weeks.
During each of those weeks he filed a weekly claim form
(UC-403C). For the weeks ending November 26, 1977, through February
11, 1978, the claimant answered "No" to the following question:
"5. Did you work or were you self employed * * * during the week
identified above. If Yes, the Employer's name, dates worked, and
gross earnings."
For the weeks ending February 18, 1978, and February 25, 1978,
the claimant answered "Yes" to the question. He entered his
employer's name as "George May." Actually during the entire period
claimant was self-employed and doing business as Lumberjack
Enterprises. His work consisted of purchasing trees and cutting
them up for firewood, and plowing snow. He purchased the equipment
for this business in November and sold the firewood commencing
in> December. During January, 1978, he also plowed snow. He did
not list his business as self-employment until he was under
investigation. Upon investigation, he gave an affidavit admitting
that he had failed to list his self-employment while seeking
unemployment benefits and further stated that he had been working
"about 40 hours in all weeks claimed." As the claimant's expenses
exceeded his income from the business, claimant believed that he
was therefore unemployed.
On March 8, 1978, Giles, the Administrator of the Bureau,
cancelled claimants unemployment benefits. Claimant requested a
reconsideration of that order on March 15, 1978, and after further
proceedings, the Administrator held that claimant had made
fraudulent representations and affirmed his original order. An
appeal was taken to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
and a hearing was held on May 17, 1978, before a Referee of the
Board. The Referee found that claimant was not guilty of any fraud
but did declare that claimant's self-employment rendered him
ineligible for any benefits. Claimant was ordered to repay all
benefits received.>
The claimant's request for a further appeal to the Board of
Review was denied and thereafter an appeal was taken to the Common
Pleas Court of Summit County. That court held in part:
"* * * that although appellant was self-employed during the
period in issue, there is no evidence that [claimant] was not
available for full-time employment while carrying-on his
log-cutting and snow-removal endeavors in his spare time, on a
part-time basis.
"The Court has further found that the Decision of the Board of
Review * * * is not supported by the preponderance of reliable,
substantial and probative evidence."
"* * *."
Thus, the Board's decision was reversed and the claimant's
application for benefits approved. That order precipitated this
appeal.
It is the Board's contention that the Common Pleas Court
erred:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
"I. * * * [I]n reversing the Decision of the Board of Review in
that the claimant was not unemployed and therefore not entitled to
benefits.
"II. * * * [I]n reversing the Board of Review in that it
misallocated the burden of establishing unemployment benefit
rights.
"III. * * * [I]n reversing the Board of Review's Decision that
the claimant was not available for work.
"IV. * * * [I]n applying a standard of review different from
that mandated by Section 4141.28(O), Ohio Revised Code."
I
R.C. 4141.35 provides that the administrator may cancel benefits
for misrepresentation, fraudulent or otherwise. Claimant's
statement on Bureau Form UC-403C that he was not self-employed was
a misrepresentation despite the lack of any fraudulent intent. The
rendering of services regardless of whether income is received
constitutes employment. Elrace Ross v. Board of Review, C.C.H.
Unemp. Ins. Rep. 1963-1971 Transfer Binder, Ohio P8454 (1965) and
Curtis T. Sink v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, C.C.H.
Unemp. Ins. Rep., 1948-1959 Transfer Binder, Ohio P8316 (1952).
A claimant who is working is not unemployed and hence not fully
eligible for unemployment benefits. R.C. 4141.01 (M) provides:
"An individual is 'totally unemployed' in any week during which
he performs no services and with respect to such week no
remuneration is payable to him."
Hence, if a claimant either performs services or receives
remuneration, he is not unemployed. See Dorsey W. Richards v. Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services, No. 37419, Cuyahoga County,
unreported, May, 1978. See also Carroll v. Giles, No. C.A. 1743,
Richland County, unreported, 1978, a case similar to the instant
case wherein the claimant while drawing unemployment compensation
started a business of his own called Carroll Auto Sales. Carroll
contended he was not self-employed apparently because he received
no income from the business. The court held that Carroll was not
entitled to unemployment compensation even though he continued to
seek other employment during the period he was operating his own
company.
The complainant's failure to report his self-employment on claim
form UC-403C was a misrepresentation and a violation of R.C.
4141.35. The first assignment of error is well taken.
II and III
A claimant for unemployment compensation has the burden of
proving he is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
Shannon v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 155 Ohio State 53
(1951). The court, however, while recognizing that the claimant was
self-employed held that there "was no evidence that [claimant] was
not available for full time employment." This issue becomes
important only if it is first determined that the claimant is
unemployed. The court by treating the two issues as one and
searching the record for evidence of non-availability placed the
burden of proof upon the Bureau, contrary to the case law and to
R.C. 4141.29(A) which provides in part:
"No individual is entitled to a waiting period or benefits for
any week unless he:
"(1) Has filed a valid application for determination of benefit
rights in accordance with section 4141.28 of the Revised Code;
"(2) Has made a claim for benefits in accordance with section
4141.28 of the Revised Code;
"(3) Has registered at an employment office or other
registration place maintained or designated by the administrator of
the bureau of employment services. Registration shall be made in
person or in writing in accordance with the time limits, frequency,
and manner prescribed by the administrator.
"(4)(a) Is able to work and available for suitable work and is
actively seeking suitable work * * *."
The claimant's statement in his affidavit that he had been
working 40 hours per week was sufficient to support the finding of
the Board of Review that claimant was not available for work.
Claimant's testimony before the Referee that he was not
self-employed 40 hours per week and was available at all times,
presented a credibility issue for the Referee. Obviously he chose
to believe claimant's first assertion. This he had a right to do
and the Court of Common Pleas as a reviewing court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the Referee.
We sustain assignments of error II and III.
IV
In light of our previous discussion, the issue raised by this
assignment of error is moot.
The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed and final
judgment entered for the Bureau of Employment Services.
-
The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
We order that a special mandate, directing the Summit County
Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution, shall
issue out of this court. A certified copy of this journal entry
shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall
constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file
stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E).
Costs taxed to appellee.
Exceptions.