FEIM,
APPELLEE,
vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
No. 77AP-630
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, FRANKLIN
COUNTY
381 N.E.2d 1340, 56 Ohio App. 2d 175, 10 Ohio Op. 3d 190
March 21, 1978, Decided
APPEAL: Court of Appeals for Franklin
County.
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- Claim denied by administrator
and board -- Denial reversed by Court of Common Pleas -- Claimant
failed to make continuous application for benefits during appeal
period -- Not entitled to benefits for period, when.
SYLLABUS
Where the denial of a claim for unemployment compensation is
reversed in an appeal before the Court of Common Pleas, a claiment
who failed to submit applications for benefits, pursuant to R. C.
4141.29(A) and regulation UC-27-02 of the Bureau of Employment
Services, during the appeal period is not entitled to benefits for
the time no claims were filed, unless deterred by circumstances
beyond his control.
COUNSEL
Messrs. Fontana, Ward, Kaps & Perry, and
Mr. David Bloomfield, for appellee.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general,
Mr. Richard S. Szilagyi and Mr. Eugene P.
Nevada, Jr., for appellants.
JUDGES
MCCORMAC, J., REILLY, J., concurs. WHITESIDE, J., dissents.
AUTHOR: MCCORMAC
OPINION
{*175} Appellee was discharged from his employment on
March 15, 1975. On March 26, 1975, appellee filed a claim for
unemployment benefits which was subsequently denied by the
administrator and the Board of Review. The Board's decision was
reversed by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, who ordered
that the claim be allowed.
Having had his disqualification for benefits removed, appellee
then claimed additional benefits for subsequent weeks ending April
12, 1975, April 19, 1975, and April 26, 1975, through August 9,
1975. The administrator disallowed these claims, and their
disallowance was affirmed by the Board of Review on the basis that
appellee had not shown that he had been deterred by circumstances
beyond his control {*176} from filing a timely claim for
benefits, as required by a regulation of the Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services. The Board held that the fact that an appeal
was pending from an adverse determination as to the initial weekly
claim was not a sufficient reason for failure to timely file claims
for subsequent weeks.
The decision of the board was appealed to the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas who reversed the holding, finding the order
of the board to be unreasonable, unlawful and against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
The administrator and the Board of Review have appealed the
judgment of the Common Pleas Court, setting forth the following
assignments of error:
"1. The Common Pleas Court erred in attempting to judicially
eliminate the registration requirements contained in 4141.29(A)(3)
and Regulation UC-27-02 which are a condition precedent to
continued eligibility for unemployment benefits.
"2. The Court of Common Pleas erred in placing the burden of
proving 'ineligibility' on the Bureau of Employment Services,
thereby ignoring the case of Shannon v.
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 155 Ohio St.
53 (1951) cited below.
"3. The decision of the Court of Common Pleas violates the
requirements of 42 USC 503 (A)(6) and the U. S. Department of
Labor."
Claimant was discharged from his employment and sought
unemployment compensation benefits. His claim was initially
disallowed by the administrator and Board on the basis that his
discharge was for just cause. Claimant appealed to the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas who held that claimant was unjustly
discharged from his employment.
After the reversal of the disallowance of the basic claim,
claimant belatedly filed a claim for other weeks of unemployment.
The reason given for the late filing was that claimant did not
realize that it was necessary to file additional claims since the
first claim had been rejected even though an appeal was taken.
Claimant said that he was not advised of any necessity to do so by
the administrator. {*177} His testimony before the Board
of Review was that he did not work at all during the weeks for
which the later claims were filed, and that he was looking for a
job during this period. Claimant admitted that there was no
physical reason why he could not have appeared to file a claim as
required by regulation and stated that he would have done so had
the initial claim been allowed.
R. C. 4141.29(A) provides, as pertinent, as follows:
"(A) No individual is entitled to a waiting period or benefits
for any week unless he:
"(1) Has filed a valid application for determination of benefit
rights in accordance with section 4141.28 of the Revised Code.
"(2) Has made a claim for benefits in accordance with section
4141.28 of the Revised Code.
"(3) Has registered at an employment office or other
registration place maintained or designated by the administrator of
the bureau of employment services. Registration shall be
made in person or in writing in accordance with the time limits,
frequency, and manner prescribed by the administrator.
"(4)(a) Is able to work and available for suitable work and is
actively seeking suitable work either in a locality in which he has
earned wages subject to Chapter 4141. of the Revised Code, during
his base period, or if he leaves such locality, then in a locality
where suitable work is normally performed." (Emphasis added.)
The administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services has
promulgated the following regulation for the registration
prescribed by R. C. 4141.29(A)(3). Regulation UC-27-02 provides as
follows:
"Claims for benefits shall be filed weekly or biweekly, in
person or by mail, on forms and in a manner prescribed by the
Administrator. An individual filing a claim for benefits shall
furnish any information necessary to determine his eligibility for
benefits. Where an individual has been permitted to register and
file a claim by mail, in accordance with Regulation UC-29-01, such
claim shall be deemed to have been filed when the individual has
mailed the prescribed dated and signed form and such form has
{*178} been received by the Bureau within the time limits
set forth in Regulation UC-27-02(A). Such form shall be deemed to
have been filed on the date on which it is postmarked.
"If for reasons constituting good cause an individual does not
file a claim for benefits on a specified reporting day the Bureau
may specify a day other than that originally established. An
individual shall file claims for benefits with the same local
office in which he filed his application for determination of
benefit rights; except that, for reasons found to constitute good
cause by the Bureau, the individual may be authorized to file
claims for benefits with any other Bureau office in this state or
another state. 4141.29(A)(2) and (3)."
An exception to the time limitation specified by UC-27-02 is
provided for in UC-27-02(C) as follows:
"In exceptional cases, when it is shown to the satisfaction of
the Administrator that an individual has been deterred by
circumstances beyond his control from filing a claim as prescribed
in Regulation UC-27-02 and that enforcement of the prescribed time
limitation would result in an inequitable determination, the
Administrator may extend the time limitations set forth in such
Regulation 4141.13(A) and (C)."
According to the regulations, an individual must have been
deterred by circumstances beyond his control from
filing a timely claim in order for there to be an extension of the
time limitation for filing claims for benefits. It is not
sufficient in itself that enforcement of the prescribed time
limitation results in an inequitable determination.
Appellee did not prove that there were circumstances beyond his
control which prevented weekly reporting, as required by
regulation, while his appeal of the initial disallowance of his
claim was pending. Claimant's excuse was simply ignorance of the
regulation in that he did not realize that he would have to
continue reporting in order to claim benefits for subsequent weeks
in the event that the initial disallowance was reversed on
appeal.
Appellee does not claim that regulation UC-27-02 is illegal.
Regulation UC-27-02 was adopted pursuant to the {*179}
express authority set forth in R. C. 4141.29(A)(3). Appellee, in
effect, seeks to have the regulation rewritten to include broader
exceptions than prescribed by the administrator.
There appear to be several reasons for requiring weekly
reporting as a condition to continued eligibility for employment
benefits. Weekly reporting provides timely information to be used
to check the claimant's eligibility, although it is doubtful in
this case that any check would have been made until the initial
disallowance was reversed. The claimant who reports is sometimes
referred to a prospective job. Moreover, the state of Ohio is
required to transmit statistics to the Secretary of Labor
concerning unemployment in Ohio irrespective of whether benefits
are payable.
The trial court found that continued reporting after the initial
claim had been disallowed would have been a vain act as his claim
had been rejected. However, it was a required act if later benefits
were to apply in the event of reversal. Moreover, reporting served
other purposes previously referred to. Appellee through counsel had
timely contested the initial rejection. The board's determination
that the claimant was not deterred by circumstances beyond his
control from filing a weekly claim as required by regulation is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence, even though
enforcement of that time limitation may have resulted in an
inequitable determination under the facts of this case.
Assignment of error number one is sustained.
Appellants' second assignment of error is overruled. The court
held that claimant fulfilled his burden of proof in establishing
his right to benefits rather than requiring the bureau to prove
ineligibility.
Appellants' third assignment of error is overruled. There is no
showing that the judgment of the Common Pleas Court violates
federal reporting requirements. The quoted regulation, when
applicable, permits excuse from these requirements. The trial court
misinterpreted the requirements of regulation UC-27-02.
Appellants' first assignment of error is sustained, and
{*180} appellants' second and third assignment of error
are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and a
final judgment is entered for appellants.
Judgment reversed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
reversed.
DISSENT
WHITESIDE, J. dissenting.
The Board of Review found claimant ineligible for benefits
because he did not make weekly filings of claims for benefits after
the initial determination that he was "ineligible for benefits for
the duration of unemployment caused by his discharge." Upon appeal,
the original determination was reversed by the Common Pleas Court,
which found that claimant should be granted "unemployment benefits
beginning with the week of March 29, 1975, subject to O. R. C.
4141.29(A)(5) and other applicable statutes."
Upon appeal of the present case, the Common Pleas Court found
that the effect of "the present order is to obviate the judgment of
July 30, 1976," upon the prior appeal, and further that:
"* * * Appellant [claimant] is not required to make vain and
useless filings during his appeal from a disallowed claim in order
to meet the technical requirements of an administrative regulation.
The appeal is sufficient notice to the bureau."
The issue, thus, is whether the judgment of the Common Pleas
Court constitutes an abuse of discretion or is contrary to law
since, pursuant to R. C. 4141.28(N), the issue before that court
was whether the decision of the Board of Review "was unlawful,
unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence."
Neither R. C. 4141.28, nor R. C. 4141.29(A), specifically
requires weekly filings of claims for benefits. R. C. 4141.29(A)(1)
requires the filing of an application for benefit rights, and R. C.
4141.29(A)(2) requires claimant to make a claim for benefits in
accordance with R. C. 4141.29. Regulation UC-27-02 does provide
that "claims for {*181} benefits shall be filed weekly or
biweekly." It is unclear, however, as to the statutory foundation
for such regulation. The decision of the Board of Review was
founded solely upon claimant's failure to follow such regulation
despite the prior finding of the same Board that such filings would
be inappropriate since the prior decision determined not only a
single benefit week but also "the duration of unemployment caused
by his discharge." Accordingly, although no continued claims had
been filed, the Bureau by the prior decision (although subsequently
reversed), effectively rejected claims for subsequent benefit weeks
as though they had in fact been filed.
Accordingly, I find no error of law, nor abuse of discretion, on
the part of the Common Pleas Court.
There is, however, an additional issue involved not reached by
the Board of Review. R. C. 4141.29(A), as a prerequisite for
benefits, requires registration "at an employment office," which
shall be made "in accordance with the time limits, frequency, and
manner prescribed by the administrator." This, claimant failed to
do, after the initial determination that he was ineligible for
benefits, regardless of what he did, which determination claimant
was successful in reversing upon the prior appeal.
However, R. C. 4141.29(A)(4)(b) specifically provides that:
"The individual shall be instructed as to the efforts that he
must make in his search for suitable work, except where the active
search for work requirement has been waived under division (A) (4)
(a) of this section, and shall keep a record of where and when he
has sought work in complying with such instructions and shall, upon
request, produce such record for examination by the
administrator."
Claimant testified that he was not so informed with respect to
registration after he was denied benefits for the duration of his
then current unemployment. R. C. 4141.46 provides that: "Sections
4141.01 to 4141.46, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be
literally construed."
To require continued weekly or biweekly filings of claims for
benefits following a determination that the {*182}
claimant is not entitled to benefits during his then current
unemployment would constitute a vain and undesirable act. The
burden that would be placed upon the Bureau, the Board of Review,
and the court would be overwhelming. Weekly or biweekly the
claimant would be compelled to file claims, the Bureau would be
compelled to deny the claims, the claimant would be required to
file appeals to the Board of Review, which would affirm the Bureau,
and the claimant would then be compelled to file an appeal to the
Common Pleas Court.
Statutes should be construed to minimize, rather than maximize,
litigation wherever appropriate. UC-27-02 specifically provides as
to the weekly or biweekly filing requirements that later filings
may be permitted "for reasons constituting good cause." The
circumstances of this case (absolute rejection of all claims for
the duration of the unemployment) constitute good cause for
claimant's failure to make continued filings contrary to such
determination. Similarly, such determination, coupled with the
failure of the Bureau to give proper instructions to claimant to do
so, pursuant to R. C. 4141.29(A)(4)(b), could reasonably be found
to constitute a situation where claimant "has been deterred by
circumstances beyond his control from filing a claim" weekly or
biweekly after such determination. It is required only that
claimant be "deterred," not that he be prevented, from filing a
claim.
Accordingly, I would overrule the assignments of error. However,
the judgment of the Common Pleas Court should be modified to
provide for remanding the cause to the Board of Review for a
determination in accordance with R. C. 4141.29(A)(5) of whether
claimant was unable to obtain suitable work and whether claimant
was actively seeking suitable work in compliance with R. C.
4141.29(A)(4)(a), which issues were not reached by the Board of
Review.