BOCKOVER,
APPELLEE,
vs.
LUDLOW CORPORATION; BOARD OF
REVIEW, OHIO BUREAU
OF
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES,
APPELLANT, ET AL
No. 85-446
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
492 N.E.2d 149, 23 Ohio St. 3d 190, 23 Ohio B. Rep. 352
April 30, 1986, Decided
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for
Knox County.
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- "Unable to obtain suitable
work," construed -- R.C. 4141.29(A) and (D), construed -- Employee
elects pursuant to labor-management agreement not to accept offer
for alternative employment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee, Daniel P. Bockover, was employed by Ludlow Packaging, a
division of Ludlow Corporation (hereinafter "Ludlow"), from June
11, 1976 until April 8, 1982, when he was laid off from his
position in the laminating department. At the time of his layoff,
appellee was a member of the United Paperworkers International
Union, AFL-CIO, Local 271, which had previously executed a
labor-management agreement with Ludlow governing the terms and
conditions of the employment of its members. Included within this
agreement was a "reverse seniority" provision enabling employees
affected by a layoff to elect to waive their displacement or
"bumping" privileges against employees in other departments with
less seniority, without suffering a loss in seniority or forfeiting
their rights to reemployment.
To exercise such an election, an employee would execute a
waiver, which remained in effect for at least thirty days and could
only be revoked with advance notification of fourteen days. Prior
to his layoff, appellee had executed a waiver with respect to all
plant departments except metalizing, laminating and plant stores.
At the time appellee executed the waiver he possessed greater
seniority than employees in various other departments at Ludlow
and, therefore, he could have "bumped" any one of a number of other
employees.
When appellee's layoff occurred, he filed for and subsequently
received unemployment benefits. Thereafter, he did not attempt to
rescind the waiver which would have made him eligible for work in
several other plant departments. Consequently, when appellee filed
an application for benefits for the week ending May 1, 1982, Ludlow
objected claiming that a rescission of the waiver as early as April
8, 1982 would have enabled him to secure satisfactory employment in
other areas of the facility.
On May 10, 1982, appellee's application for unemployment
compensation benefits for the week ending May 1, 1982 was allowed.
This allowance was later affirmed on reconsideration by the
Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. Ludlow
then sought further review by the Board of Review of the Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services, appellant herein, which reversed the
administrator's allowance of benefits on the basis that if appellee
had withdrawn his waiver he would have been able to obtain work at
Ludlow during the week ending May 1, 1982.
From this judgment, appellee perfected an appeal to the Court of
Common Pleas of Knox County. That court affirmed the denial of
benefits by entry dated November 2, 1984. A further appeal to the
court of appeals resulted in reversal of the judgment of the lower
court on the basis that the court, as well as the board of review,
had incorrectly applied the provisions of R.C. 4141.29(A) and (D).
Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that while
unemployment compensation benefits may be denied under R.C.
4141.29(A)(5) if the applicant is able to obtain
suitable work, nevertheless, pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(b)(i),
appellee was not required to rescind his waiver in order to remain
eligible to receive unemployment benefits.
The court of appeals finding its judgment to be in conflict with
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Mercer County in
Craft v. . Giles (June 12, 1981),
No. 10-80-9, unreported, certified the record of the case to this
court for review and final determination.
COUNSEL
Jaffy, Livorno, Kaufmann & Arnett Co., L.P.A.,
Stewart R. Jaffy and Henry A. Arnett, for
appellee.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney
general, Patrick A. Devine and George H.
Calloway, for appellant.
Jordan Rossen, Richard W. McHugh, Lackey, Nusbaum,
Reny & Torzewski and Gerald Lackey,
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America.
JUDGES
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and
WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and
WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
AUTHOR: PER CURIAM
OPINION
{*192} As is relevant to the within appeal, R.C. 4141.29
provides:
"Each eligible individual shall receive benefits as compensation
for loss of remuneration due to involuntary total or partial
unemployment in the amounts and subject to the conditions
stipulated in sections 4141.01 to 4141.46 of the Revised Code.
"(A) No individual is entitled to a waiting period or benefits
for any week unless he:
"* * *
"(5) Is unable to obtain suitable work.
"* * *
"(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual
may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following
conditions:
"* * *
"(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator
finds that:
"* * *
"(b) He has refused without good cause to accept an offer of
suitable work when made by an employer either in person or to his
last known address, or has refused or failed to investigate a
referral to suitable work when directed to do so by a local
employment office of this state or another state;
provided, that this division shall not cause a
disqualification for a waiting week or benefits under the following
circumstances:
"(i) When work is offered by his employer and he is not required
to accept the offer pursuant to the terms of the labor-management
contract or agreement, or pursuant to an established employer plan,
program, or policy; * * *." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that notwithstanding R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(b)(i)
above, the offer by Ludlow of suitable work, which was refused
pursuant to the previously executed waiver, operated to preclude
the receipt of benefits for the week in which the employment was
offered and for any subsequent weeks that appellee was offered
suitable employment. In support of this contention, appellant
submits that subdivision (A)(5) survives the exception under
subdivision (D)(2)(b)(i) as construed in Craft v.
. Giles, supra.
In Craft, upon facts virtually identical to
those presented in the cause sub judice, the Court
of Appeals for Mercer County first concluded that, pursuant to R.C.
4141.29(A)(5), an employee is not entitled to benefits unless he is
unable to procure suitable work. The court then analyzed R.C.
4141.29(D) as follows: first, the court correctly observed that if
an employee, without good cause, refuses to accept an offer for
suitable work, {*193} then pursuant to subdivision
(D)(2)(b), that employee forfeits the right to receive benefits or
to serve a waiting period for the duration of his
unemployment; next, the court reasoned that the exception contained
under subdivision (b)(i), providing that no disqualification
results when an employee rejects an offer of employment by his
employer, pursuant to the terms of a labor-management contract,
simply means that no disqualification for the duration of the
unemployment term will result if such offer is refused; but, the
court concluded that an employer's offer of alternative employment
will serve to disqualify the employee from receiving unemployment
benefits for the week in which the offer is extended. According to
the court in Craft, this interpretation is
"consistent with the purpose of the [Unemployment Compensation]
Act," and furthers the state's as well as an employee's interest in
accepting employment opportunities.
The interpretation of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(b)(i) as espoused in
Craft was rejected by the court of appeals in the
present cause, as well as by the Court of Appeals for Pike County
in Conley v. . Bd. of Review
(Feb. 21, 1980), Pike App. No. 306, unreported. We are likewise
compelled to reject that line of reasoning.
In 1973, R.C. 4141.29(A) provided, as it does today, that in
order for a claimant to be eligible for benefits he must be "unable
to obtain suitable work." At that time, R.C. 4141.29(D) provided
that notwithstanding subdivision (A), benefits were not payable for
any week where the unemployment was the result of a labor dispute,
worker misconduct, or the refusal to accept without good cause an
offer for suitable employment. In January 1974, subsection
(D)(2)(a) was amended as follows:
"[An employee will not receive benefits] [f]or the duration of
his unemployment if the administrator finds that:
"(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged
for just cause in connection with his work, provided * * * this
section does not apply to the separation of a person under any of
the following circumstances:
"* * *
"(ii) Separation from employment pursuant to a labor-management
contract * * * or pursuant to an established employer plan * * *
which permits the employee, because of lack of work, to accept a
separation from employment."
In addition, R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(b) was amended in 1974 to
provide as follows:
"[An employee will not receive benefits] [f]or the duration of
his unemployment if the administrator finds that:
"* * *
"(b) He has refused without good cause to accept an offer of
suitable work when made by an employer * * * provided, that
this division shall {*194} not cause a disqualification
for * * * benefits under the following circumstances :
"(i) When work is offered by his employer and he is not required
to accept the offer pursuant to the terms of the labor-management
contract or agreement, or pursuant to an established employer plan,
program or policy." (Emphasis added.) (135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 201,
242-243.)
The intent of the General Assembly as evidenced by the foregoing
amendments is clear and unambiguous. That is, when an employee
elects pursuant to a labor-management agreement not to accept an
offer for alternative employment offered by the employer, the
employee is not disqualified under subdivision (D)(2)(a) for having
"quit his work without just cause," nor is he disqualified pursuant
to subdivision (D)(2)(b) for having refused without good cause to
accept an offer of suitable work. To accept appellant's contention
that an employee who exercises his election under subdivision
(D)(2)(b)(i) is somehow prevented by subdivision (A)(5) from
receiving benefits would be to ignore the similarities between the
two sections and effectively excise the later provisions from the
statute. For as the court in Conley observed, the
requirement under subdivision (A)(5) that a claimant be "unable to
obtain suitable work" is essentially restated under subdivision
(D)(2)(b) which provides that an employee may not receive benefits
for the duration of his unemployment if "[h]e has refused without
good cause to accept an offer of suitable work."
Furthermore, as was stated in Conley, "[i]n
creating the exception to the basic requirement that the
non-acceptance of work pursuant to a labor-management contract
shall not operate as a refusal to accept suitable work, it would
be, in our view, paradoxical that the General Assembly intended to
nevertheless disqualify the claimant pursuant to subsection (A)(5).
In sum, such an interpretation would render the exception [under
R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(b)(i)] meaningless and negate its effect."
Id. at 4-5.
It is firmly established in Ohio "that words used in a statute
are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the
legislative intent indicates otherwise." Ohio Assn. of Pub.
School Emp. v. . Twin Valley Local School Dist.
Bd. of Edn. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 178, 181. Moreover,
"[i]n determining legislative intent it is the duty of this court
to give effect to the words used [in a statute], not to delete
words used or to insert words not used." Columbus-Suburban
Coach Lines v. . Pub. Util. Comm. (1969),
20 Ohio St. 2d 125, 127 [49 O.O.2d 445]. See, also,
Dougherty v. . Torrence (1982), 2
Ohio St. 3d 69, 70. The judgment of the court below gives effect to
the clear and unambiguous language contained within R.C.
4141.29(D)(2)(b)(i) and, unlike the judgment in
Craft, does not attempt to delete language from
this provision and insert in its place the provisions of
subdivision (A)(5). Accordingly, the court of appeals properly
concluded that the clear import of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(b)(i)
constitutes an exception to the general requirement under
subsection (A)(5) that benefits are not available unless the
employee is unable to obtain suitable work.
{*195} For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
court of appeals is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
affirmed.
Judgment
affirmed.
CONCURRENCE
HOLMES, J., concurring.
The legislative history of the particular statute involved here
would seem to clearly show the intent of the General Assembly. R.C.
4141.29, as amended, must reasonably be interpreted to mean that a
waiver of bumping privilege, or other provision exempting the
employee from accepting an offer of certain type of work, which
provision is contained within a labor-management contract, creates
an exception to the general rule which would, absent the contract,
require a denial of unemployment benefits, in that the employee
otherwise would be able "to obtain suitable work."