HI-STATE BEVERAGE COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES et
al., Appellees
No. 91AP-118
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, FRANKLIN
COUNTY
603 N.E.2d 274, 77 Ohio App. 3d 633
October 10, 1991, Decided
Appeal from the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas.
COUNSEL
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, David A.
Kadela and James M. L. Ferber, for
appellant.
Lee Fisher, Attorney General,
Cordelia A. Glenn and Stefan J.
Schmidt, for appellees.
JUDGES
Hooper, Judge. Bowman, P.J., and Strausbaugh, J., concur. James J.
Hooper, J., retired, of the Miami County Court of Common Pleas, was
assigned to active duty under authority of Section 6(C), Article
IV, Ohio Constitution.
AUTHOR: HOOPER
OPINION
{*634} Hooper, Judge.
Appellant, Hi-State Beverage Company ("Hi-State"), appeals the
decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, affirming
the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
("board"), which allowed all of claimants' claims for unemployment
compensation.
On June 1, 1987, employees of Hi-State, represented by Teamsters
Local 284 ("Union"), went on strike after failure to negotiate a
new contract on the expiration of the existing one. The strike
arose primarily from Hi-State's implementation of a different
method of sales and delivery of its products which would eliminate
a large portion of the drivers-helpers' job description and
concomitant pay. In March 1987, at the inception of the
renegotiation of the expiring labor contract between Hi-State and
the Union>, Hi-State proposed that the drivers-helpers be
compensated solely on the basis of hourly wage as opposed to the
previous combination of hourly wages and commission on sales.
The Union opposed the elimination of commissions as a part of
the drivers-helpers' compensation and refused to negotiate on the
issue. Originally offering $ 10 per hour compensation, on April 28,
1987, Hi-State, in a stated attempt to break the impasse in
negotiations, increased its offer of an hourly wage by $ .25 per
hour. The Union> rejected this offer, and no further
negotiations were conducted. As stated, on June 1, 1987, the
employees went out on strike against Hi-State.
During the strike, fifty-seven of the employees filed
unemployment compensation claims. Originally, in October 1987, the
Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services ("OBES")
denied the claims for first weekly benefits, finding the claimants
were unemployed during a labor dispute other than a lockout. R.C.
4141.29(D)(1)(a). Upon request for reconsideration, in
{*635} December 1987, the Administrator of OBES certified
the claims to the board as a mass appeal.
In April 1988, the balance of claims for subsequent weeks of
unemployment was allowed, the administrator finding that the labor
dispute had ended on June 19, 1987. Upon request for
reconsideration by Hi-State, the administrator certified Hi-State's
and claimants' appeals to the board as a mass appeal. The board
conducted a hearing held on October 5, 1987. As a result of that
hearing, the board held that Hi-State had locked the claimants out
and, further, since the employees had been replaced, their
unemployment was due to lack of work, not a labor dispute.
The decisions of the board were timely appealed to the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas. On January 3, 1991, the court found
that the board's decisions were supported by credible evidence and
based upon a proper application of the law; it affirmed the
decision of the board. It is from that decision that this appeal
arose.
Assignment of error number one states:
"The common pleas court erred by affirming the board's holding
that the claimants were initially separated from the company's
employ as a result of a lockout."
R.C. 4141.29(D)(1)(a) provides in pertinent part:
"(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual
may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following
conditions:
"(1) For any week with respect to which the administrator finds
that:
"(a) His unemployment was due to a labor dispute other
than a lockout * * *." (Emphasis added.)
In Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey
(1958), 168 Ohio St. 351, 354, 7 O.O.2d 119, 121, 155 N.E.2d 202,
205 the court defined "lockout" as:
"A lockout has been defined as a cessation of the furnishing of
work to employees or a withholding of work from them in an effort
to get for the employer more desirable terms. Iron Molders'
Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F., 45, 52 [1908], 20
L.R.A. (N.S.), 315, 91 C.C.A., 631; 25 Words and Phrases, 566; 33
Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 189, Section 65."
The court in Bays v. Shenango Co. (1990), 53
Ohio St.3d 132, 559 N.E.2d 740, quoted with approval the definition
of "lockout" contained in Zanesville, but then
enlarged upon the bases for determining if a lockout exists by
adopting the "status quo" test first espoused in Erie Forge
& Steel Corp. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review ("Vrotney
Unemployment Compensation Case") (1960), 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91,
and adopted by the court of appeals in Oriti
{*636} v. Bd. of Review (1983), 7 Ohio App.3d
311, 7 OBR 394, 455 N.E.2d 720. The "Vrotney" test holds that:
"* * * Where employees offer to continue working under the terms
of a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement pending final
settlement of a labor dispute, the failure of the employer to
accept such an offer constitutes a lockout unless it is
demonstrated that the employer has a compelling reason for failing
to so agree such that the extension of the contract would be
unreasonable under the circumstances." Id., 7 Ohio
App.3d at 314, 7 OBR at 398, 455 N.E.2d at 724.
The court in Bays, supra, at 135, 559 N.E.2d at
743, adopted the "status quo" addition to the tests to determine if
a lockout existed by holding:
"The status-quo test requires that actions of both the employer
and the union be scrutinized in order to ascertain whether the
parties sought to maintain the status quo. 'Since the purpose of
our unemployment compensation system is to compensate an individual
when work has been denied him through no fault of his own,
logically the test of whether a work stoppage resulted from a
strike or a lock-out requires us to determine which side, union or
management, first refused to continue operations under the status
quo after the contract had technically expired, but while
negotiations were continuing.' Philco Corp. v. Unemp. Comp.
Bd. of Review (1968), 430 Pa. 101, 103, 242 A.2d 454,
455.
"* * *
"* * * An employer deviates from the status quo if it refuses to
allow work to continue for a reasonable time under the
existing terms and conditions of employment while negotiations
continue. * * *
"'* * * Determination of which side, union or management, first
refused to continue operations under the status quo after the
contract had technically expired, but while negotiations were
continuing, must be made in order to conclude whether work stoppage
was the result of a strike or lockout. * * *' (Emphasis deleted.)
(Citation omitted.) Lozaro v. Commw. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of
Review (1985), 91 Pa.Commw. 428, 431-432, 497 A.2d 680,
682."
The board, in its decisions, granting the claims of the
claimants, both in its findings of fact and in the reasons stated
for granting the claims, made a specific finding that "* * *
pending resolution, the union was willing to continue to work under
the old contract. These proposals were rejected by the company."
Based upon the finding of fact of the alleged offer to continue to
work, the board then applied the status quo test and held, on page
6 of its decision:
{*637} "* * * Although the union offered to continue
working under the old contract pending resolution of a new
contract, this was rejected by the company and the new terms of
employment were to be instituted, regardless of any negotiations,
effective June 1, 1987."
Then, citing Zanesville and
Oriti for the proposition that the employer had
not maintained the status quo and, further, to justify the failure
to maintain the status quo that the employer had made no
allegations that any loss had been incurred and, further, that no
reason had been shown by the employer for the change other than
efficiency of delivery, the board held that those reasons did not
constitute a compelling reason as contemplated in
Oriti. Accordingly, the claims were granted.
Prior to January of 1987, the drivers-helpers employed by
Hi-State were compensated on a basis of an hourly wage and a
commission on the number of cases of beverages sold at each of the
stops. The combination of hourly wages, including overtime and the
commission to be earned, provided income to the drivers-helpers in
the amount of $ 35,000 to $ 40,000 per year. This figure was not
controverted at the hearing below.
In January 1987, Hi-State implemented a different type of
marketing procedure which it defined as "pre-sale." This involved
the employment or utilization of existing salesmen to contact
customers as to their requirements for the various types of
products of the distributor, to make the sale accordingly, and then
the next day the driver would simply deliver the exact amounts
previously sold. The advantage of this type of operation to
Hi-State was a more efficient operation in that the exact amount of
product could be loaded on the trucks and delivered the following
day with no necessity to load the truck with various types and
amounts of products which may or may not be sold depending on the
needs of the customers. This procedure obviated return of the
trucks of unsold product and any attendant breakage or losses.
Hi-State, at the hearing below, testified that the pre-sale method
was adopted by the Coca Cola Company and Hill Distributing Company
in Columbus, and was encouraged by their suppliers of the product
as a more efficient manner of servicing their customers. This
pre-sale method of operation was put into effect in January 1987
and was in effect on March 3, 1987 when, pursuant to the terms of
the labor contract, the Union notified Hi-State of its intent to
renegotiate the existing contract.
On April 2, 1987, Hi-State responded with its proposal in which
it proposed to modify the form of compensation paid to the
drivers-helpers by eliminating the commission that they had been
receiving under the previous contract and going to a strictly
hourly basis of compensation at $ 10 per hour. In addition, the
warehousemen and other employees of Hi-State, who were currently
{*638} already on an hourly basis, were offered an
increase in hourly compensation under the terms of this
proposal.
The Union refused to accept either of these proposals and
notified Hi-State that it was "adamantly" opposed to eliminating
the commission basis of pay and would not negotiate on that point.
On April 28, 1987, Hi-State communicated to the Union that it was
increasing its proposed hourly rate by $ .25 per hour as an attempt
to break the impasse in negotiations. The Union rejected this
offer. On May 11, 1987, Hi-State communicated with the Union and
reaffirmed its position that the driver-helper-warehouse-forklift
classifications be combined into a single driver-warehouse
classification with all employees to be paid on an hourly basis and
eliminating load limits. The Union adopted the position that these
classifications could not be consolidated, and that the
drivers-helpers would have to continue to be paid on a commission
basis and formal load limits be continued. Negotiations were at an
impasse.
By letter of May 29, 1987, Hi-State notified the Union that, as
of May 28, Hi-State had presented its final offer which consisted
of the April 2, 1987 proposal as modified by the proposal of April
28, 1987.
Albert A. Rossetti, testifying on behalf of Hi-State at the
hearing, testified as follows:
"Q. The last bargaining session was on May 28th?
"A. Correct.
"Q. What happened at that session?
"A. The company presented its final proposal.
"Q. Did the union make any proposals?
"A. Yes, they presented theirs.
"Q. What was their proposal?
"A. Their proposal was to follow Columbus Distributing's present
contract.
"Q. And under that contract Columbus Distributing's employees
were paid on a, or drivers and helpers were paid on a commission
basis?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay."
On midnight May 31, 1987, the Union set up a picket line at
Hi-State's facility. Hi-State was not notified formally of the
Union's vote to initiate a strike.
In anticipation of the Union's strike vote, Hi-State had
solicited replacement employees on the contingency that they would
be hired only in the event of a {*639} strike and provided
that the employees were qualified both with driver's licenses and
for insurance purposes. These employees were instructed to report
at 6:00 a.m., on June 1, 1987, and, at that time, they were not
required to clock in. At 8:30 a.m., the normal start time, the
number of pickets had increased to approximately ninety in front of
Hi-State's facility, and none of the claimants had reported for
work. At 8:45 a.m., the replacement employees were permitted to
clock in, and then proceeded to begin working.
As previously stated, the board relied upon its finding of fact
that the employees had offered to continue to work under the
existing contract, as contemplated in the Bays and
Oriti holdings. The only evidence concerning any
offer to continue to work was that contained in the direct
examination of Rossetti above stated. There was no offer made by
the employees to continue to work under the existing contract. The
offer to work under a contract such as the Columbus Distributing
Company contract (incorrectly described in the board's decision as
the "Coca Cola Company contract") does not rise to the level of an
offer to continue to work under the existing contract between
Hi-State and the Union. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the Columbus Distributing Company contract was in any way the
same as the existing contract. There is nothing to indicate its
terms and conditions, its rate of pay or the manner of payment, or
any existing contractual requirements which would be the same as or
different from the Hi-State contract. Accordingly, this court
cannot construe that as an offer to continue to operate while
negotiations continue. There is nothing in the record to indicate
any other type of offer to continue work on behalf of the employees
nor can one be inferred from any testimony contained in the record
below.
This is an error on the part of the board and was a major
predicate to its finding of the failure of the company to maintain
a status quo. But for the finding by the board of the "offer to
continue to work" on behalf of the employees, the board would have
been required to look at other criteria for determining if there
was a lockout. Under the existing definition of "lockout" contained
in Bays, this court would find that there was not
a lockout so as to remove the employees from operation of R.C.
4141.29(D)(1)(a).
Hi-State implemented the pre-sale procedure for marketing its
product as a means of more efficient operation of its company.
Testimony at the hearing below indicated that the cost of marketing
to the company would be essentially the same in that, although the
employee drivers-helpers were reduced from $ 35,000-$ 40,000 to $
20,000-21,000 per year, the salaries of the salesmen were $ 25,000
a year so that the total cost of sale and delivery would be equal
to or greater than the original cost under the labor contract. The
savings to the company were realized, the testimony shows, by
greater efficiency, fewer {*640} deliveries, lower fuel
costs, lower operation costs, less breakage, less returns and
general overall efficiency of operation. These goals were
consistent with the business objective of Hi-State and the pre-sale
method of marketing was not implemented as a vehicle to coerce the
drivers-helpers into a lower wage.
The board's holding that a lockout occurred by Hi-State is
unsupported by the evidence which was produced at the hearing and
upon which the board relied in rendering its decision.
Finally, the facts and holdings of Zanesville
are applicable to this case. In Zanesville, the
court stated:
"If the facts in this case had been that the request to continue
work at reduced wages was made unexpectedly and without any
opportunity for prior negotiations, we might be inclined to agree
that such request was unreasonable. However, the undisputed facts
in this case are that for at least two and a half months before the
expiration of this contract the union was aware of the straitened
circumstances of the company and of its announced intention not to
continue the contract. * * *" Id., 168 Ohio St. at
355, 7 O.O.2d at 122, 155 N.E.2d at 206.
Here, the Union was well aware for five months prior to
initiating a strike of Hi-State's intention to change its method of
marketing its product. However, the Union at no time would consider
Hi-State's proposal or offer a counter proposal. As stated in
Bays, supra, 53 Ohio St.3d at 134, 559 N.E.2d at
743:
"'* * * The sole test under * * * the Unemployment Compensation
Law, * * * of whether the work stoppage is the responsibility of
the employer or the employees is reduced to the following: Have the
employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under
the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert
a work stoppage pending the final settlement of the contract
negotiations; and has the employer agreed to permit work to
continue for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and
conditions of employment pending further negotiations? * * *'"
(Quoting Erie Forge & Steel Corp., supra, 400
Pa. at 444-445, 163 A.2d at 93-94.)
Applying the above test, this court would find that, based on
the record below, the employees did not offer to continue work so
as to avert a work stoppage and did, in fact, go out on strike, and
that the employer was not offered the option of continuing to
permit work for a reasonable time and, accordingly, did not agree
to such continuance. Further, the employer presented adequate
evidence of non-economic reasons for implementing the work
compensation plan adopted and, when coupled with the five-month
period in which the proposal was known to the employees, does not
lead to the {*641} conclusion that the employees could
reasonably be expected to not accept the proposal and be required
to leave work.
Therefore, we find that the board's holding that the claimants
were initially separated from Hi-State's employ as a result of a
lockout was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight
of the evidence and, accordingly, the trial court was in error in
affirming the decision of the board.
The first assignment of error is sustained.
The second assignment of error states:
"The common pleas court erred by affirming the board's holding
that the claimants were separated from the company's employ due to
a lack of work."
The board, in its decisions, held that the employees were all
aware that permanent replacements had been hired and that, although
the employer asserted that the positions were held open, this was
for a matter of mere hours. The board further based its decisions
on the fact that the employer "* * * took the affirmative action of
notifying the union that the company was decertifying the union as
a bargaining agent for employees. * * *" The board further found as
both a finding of fact and a reasoning in its decision that, prior
to the weeks in issue, the employer had taken an affirmative action
to notify the claimants of the fact that they had been permanently
replaced and that the Union was no longer recognized. Additionally,
the board found that when employees attempted to return to work,
they were not immediately re-employed, but were told they would be
re-employed if and when the employer had positions available.
The transcript of the proceedings below and the exhibits offered
and admitted into evidence do not support these findings of fact or
holding of the court. The board is in error in relying upon these
facts since they do not exist in the records.
The record does reveal that, in anticipation of the upcoming
strike and in order to continue the operation of Hi-State because
the workload was too great for the management staff, it was
necessary for Hi-State to hire replacement employees. The testimony
further reveals that the replacement employees were hired on a
contingent basis, but that at the outset of the strike and, more
specifically, at 8:45 in the morning of June 1, they were permitted
to clock in and start to work. Further testimony contained in the
transcript reveals that Hi-State did not advise the striking
employees relative to their being replaced nor did it notify the
striking employees that they had, in fact, been replaced. Further,
testimony reveals that the striking employees were not advised that
they had been terminated or discharged nor were they told that they
would not have a job if they offered to return to work.
{*642} The testimony further revealed that Hi-State had
determined to handle offers on the part of the employees to return
to work on an individual basis as they came in or made an offer to
return. Only two of the employees requested to return to work and
neither of them offered to return to work on an unconditional basis
or were qualified for positions which were open at the time that
the offer was made. Hi-State further testified that, immediately
after the strike began, openings did arise and that they, in fact,
during the period from June 1987 to April 1989, had numerous
vacancies which would have been filled by the striking employees if
they had offered individually to return to work. The board premised
its decision on the holding of Baugh v. United Tel.
Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 419, 8 O.O.3d 427, 377 N.E.2d
766.
Contrary to the interpretation of the board,
Baugh does not stand for the proposition that an
employer terminates striking employees by the mere act of hiring
replacements alone. The syllabus of Baugh has the
operative clause, "* * * preventing any volition on the part of
said employee to return to work * * *," as a qualifier to the act
of hiring permanent replacement employees.
In Baugh, the employees refused to work on June
1, 1972 after a cooling-off period and the company did commence
hiring permanent replacement employees. Of particular note at that
point in time, each striking traffic employee received a second
letter from the company shortly after June 1, 1972, advising the
employee that he or she had been permanently replaced. Further, by
letter, the employer had notified the union representative on May
25, 1972, of its intent to hire permanent replacements and,
further, if such employee did not report to work June 1,
the immediate hiring of permanent replacements would commence and
if at the end of the strike a replacement occupied the employee's
former job, the employee had no job. Finally, a second
letter was sent to the employees shortly after the June 1 deadline
informing them that their positions had been filled. Based upon
this fact situation, the court found that the employees had been
severed from employee status and that that severance was the
proximate cause of the appellants' unemployment.
The facts above recited found in Baugh are at
distinct variance with the facts contained in the caption case and,
as such, Baugh is not as found by the board
"directly on point with Baugh."
First, unlike Baugh, striking employees
received no letter or, for that matter, were they informed that the
employees had been permanently replaced. Second, contrary to the
facts of Baugh, Hi-State did not at any time
advise each employee that if he did not report to work on June 1,
the immediate hiring of a permanent replacement would commence nor,
if at the end of the strike, that a replacement employee occupied
his job, he would have {*643} no job. To the contrary, the
transcript reveals that the employees were not advised that they
did not have jobs, and the position of Hi-State was that they would
have jobs if job openings occurred subsequent to the strike's
termination. Finally, contrary to the facts of
Baugh, at no time were the employees advised that
their positions had been filled and that they were no longer
considered to be employees. To the contrary, they specifically were
not notified of these facts and Hi-State's position was that they
retained their status as employees.
Accordingly, it cannot be found from the existing facts and
evidence contained in the record of this case that the employer
terminated the claimants' status as employees.
Hi-State correctly states that under the National Labor
Relations Act, Section 151 et seq., Title 29,
U.S.Code and in Natl. Labor Relations Bd. v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co. (1938), 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82
L.Ed. 1381, the United States Supreme Court held that under the
Act, an employer has the right to hire such replacements in order
to protect and continue his business in the face of a strike.
Recognizing that right, the court cautioned that the hiring of
permanent replacements does not in and of itself result in the
termination of employees on strike, declaring that strikers retain
their status as employees after replacements have been hired. That
is the precise status of this case.
Baugh established the proximate causation test
to determine if, in fact, the actions of the employer in hiring
replacements were the proximate cause of the lack of work for the
employee. Having hired replacements, but reserving to the employees
the right to return to work when openings occurred and, upon the
unconditional offer of re-employment by Hi-State, when coupled with
the fact that the employees remained on strike continually well
after the filing of these claims, with the fact that none of the
employees have sought to return to work, this court cannot say that
the cause of the unemployment was due to lack of work as found by
the board below.
Accordingly, this court finds that the board's holding that the
claimants were separated from Hi-State's employ due to lack of work
was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the
evidence, and the decision of the common pleas court in affirming
the decision of the board was in error.
Finally, the board, in its decision, placed significant emphasis
on the fact that after receiving a petition from the new employees,
Hi-State withdrew recognition of the Union, in effect holding that
this act terminated the labor dispute. This holding is in error.
Hi-State's withdrawal of recognition of the Union has absolutely no
bearing on the employment status of the strikers and
{*644} in no way affects the reinstatement rights of
strikers. Additionally, it does not terminate the labor dispute.
The board's reliance on this fact as determining the June 19, 1987
termination of the labor dispute was in error.
Appellant's second assignment of error is sustained.
This court, having found the assignments of error to be well
taken, remands this matter to the trial court with instructions to
remand to the Ohio Unemployment Board of Review for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Bowman, P.J., and Strausbaugh, J., concur.
James J. Hooper, J., retired, of the Miami County Court of
Common Pleas, was assigned to active duty under authority of
Section 6(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.
DISPOSITION
Judgment reversed and cause
remanded.