MAYES,
APPELLANT,
vs.
BOARD OF
REVIEW, OHIO BUREAU OF
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, ET
AL., APPELLEES
No. 86AP-509
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, FRANKLIN
COUNTY
513 N.E.2d 818, 32 Ohio App. 3d 68
October 30, 1986, Decided
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- School bus drivers --
Conviction of OMVI during off-work hours -- R.C. 3327.09 and
3327.10 -- Loss of insurability is "just cause" for
discharge.
SYLLABUS
A school bus driver who is convicted of driving while intoxicated
for an offense which occurred during off-work hours and, as a
result, is refused insurance by the school board's insurer, and is
discharged, has been discharged for just cause. (R.C.
4141.29[D][2][a], 3327.09 and 3327.10, applied.)
COUNSEL
Robert G. Byrom, and Ohio
Association of Public School Employees, for
appellant.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney
general, and Patrick A. Devine, for appellee Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services.
Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker and
James P. Burnes, for appellee Westerville Board of
Education.
JUDGES
CARNEY, J. STRAUSBAUGH and REILLY, JJ., concur. CARNEY, J.,
retired, of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, sitting
by assignment.
AUTHOR: CARNEY
OPINION
{*68} This matter is before us on the appeal of Margaret
A. Mayes from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas affirming a decision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review. The board of review denied appellant's application
for unemployment compensation benefits.
Margaret Mayes was employed by the Westerville Board of
Education as a school bus driver from 1976 to April 1, 1985. Her
employment was contingent upon the statutory requirement of being
certified by the board of education. One of the conditions for
certification was maintaining an insurable status with the school
district's insurance carrier.
In January 1984, appellant was convicted of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ("DWI"). The incident
occurred during off-work hours while appellant was driving her own
car. Appellant was granted limited driving privileges during her
thirty-day suspension. Therefore, she was able to continue her
bus-driving duties without any interruption in service. It is
unclear at what point in time the school district became aware of
appellant's DWI conviction. However, the insurance carrier notified
the school district that appellant was uninsurable as a school bus
driver effective April 1, 1985. Due to her uninsurable status, the
school district had no choice but to revoke her bus driver's
certificate and give her notice of the termination of her
employment.
Appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The
Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services denied her
request since she had been discharged for just cause in connection
with her work pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). She appealed this
decision to the board of review. An evidentiary hearing was held
before a referee. The referee affirmed the administrator's
{*69} decision and found that insurability was a condition
of appellant's employment which she failed to maintain. Thereafter,
the board of review adopted the referee's decision. Mayes then
appealed this decision to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O). The common pleas court found the
decision of the board of review to be neither unreasonable,
illegal, nor against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Thereafter, this appeal ensued.
Appellant's sole assignment of error asserts:
"The Court of Common Pleas erred in affirming the decision of
the Board of Review disallowing further appeal for the reason that
her discharge, solely based on an arbitrary determination of
'insurability,' was unreasonable under the evidence of record, and
not a result of willful conduct on Appellant's part, [and,]
therefore, could not be considered just cause for discharge under §
4141.29(D)(2)(a)."
In reviewing an appeal on the manifest weight of the evidence to
a court of common pleas from an agency ruling, the question for
this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See
Rohde v. . Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio
St. 2d 82, 52 O.O. 2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685. "'In order to have just
cause for discharge, pursuant to R.C. 4141.29, there must be some
fault on the part of the employee involved, in the absence of an
overwhelming contractual provision. Such fault does not require
misconduct; but, nonetheless, fault must be a factor in the
justification for discharge.'" Chandler v.
. Administrator (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 148, 149,
11 OBR 229, 230, 463 N.E.2d 659, 660. "'[T]he critical issue is not
whether an employee has technically violated some company rule, but
* * * whether the employee, by his actions, [has] demonstrated an
unreasonable disregard for his employer's best interests.'"
Kiikka v. . Ohio Bur. of Emp.
Services (1985), 21 Ohio App. 3d 168, 169, 21 OBR 178,
180, 486 N.E.2d 1233, 1234.
In the facts before us, R.C. 3327.09 requires each school
district to procure vehicle liability insurance for the
transportation of its school children. Furthermore, R.C. 3327.10(A)
sets forth the qualifications for school bus drivers requiring,
among other things, that the county board of education or
superintendent, depending on the circumstances, issue a certificate
to affirm that "* * * such person is at least eighteen years of age
and is of good moral character and is qualified physically and
otherwise for such position. * * *" Appellant's uninsurable status,
caused by her DWI conviction and the revocation of her certificate,
made it impossible for her to perform her duties as a school bus
driver. Because the school district is statutorily mandated to
provide liability insurance for each of its school bus drivers,
appellant violated the condition of her employment by failing to
maintain her insurable status.
Appellant argues that the board of review's decision finding her
to be uninsurable was based solely on an arbitrary decision, was
unreasonable, and could not be considered as the "just cause" upon
which her termination was based. "Just cause" for terminating a
person's employment "is that kind of conduct which an ordinarily
intelligent person would regard as a justifiable reason for
discharging an employee. * * *" Angelkovski v.
. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d
159, 11 OBR 242, 463 N.E.2d 1280, paragraph four of the syllabus.
Although appellant did not violate any board of education
regulation, her act, the DWI conviction causing {*70} her
to assume uninsurable status, was in violation of her employer's
best interests. Her employer, the Westerville Board of Education,
was unable to insure her as bus driver, which it was statutorily
required to do. Therefore, by violating her employer's best
interests, the Westerville Board of Education had a reasonable
basis upon which to discharge appellant for just cause.
Kiikka, supra.
Upon review, there is sufficient evidence in the record to
support the common pleas court's decision. The common pleas court
did not abuse its discretion in affirming the board of review's
decision denying appellant unemployment benefits. Furthermore, as a
matter of law, its decision is neither unreasonable nor
illegal.
Appellant's sole assignment of error is not well-taken and is
overruled. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
affirmed.