SAMBUNJAK>,
APPELLEE,
vs.
BOARD OF
REVIEW, OHIO BUREAU OF
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
No. 47015
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, CUYAHOGA
COUNTY
471 N.E.2d 835, 14 Ohio App. 3d 432, 14 Ohio B. Rep. 550
March 9, 1984, Decided
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- Denial of benefits -- Appeal
to court of common pleas -- Request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law -- Delay by trial court in filing same not
prejudicial -- Appeal -- Claim that judgment is against manifest
weight of evidence -- Judgment reversible, when.
SYLLABUS
1. Civ. R. 52 imposes no time limit on the court within which it
must file its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and, hence,
the delay in so doing cannot be deemed prejudicial.
2. In dealing with a claim that the judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court can reverse only
if the verdict is so manifestly contrary to the natural and
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence as to produce a
result in complete violation of substantial justice.
COUNSEL
Mr. Carl Nash, for appellee.
Mr. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney
general, and Mr. Q. Albert Corsi, for appellant
Board of Review.
Mr. Donald N. Jaffe, for appellant Hahn
Manufacturing Co.
JUDGES
NAHRA, J. DAY, C.J., concurs. PARRINO, J., concurs in part and
dissents in part.
AUTHOR: NAHRA
OPINION
{*432} Claimant-appellee Sambunjak requested time off from
his supervisor to go hunting. The supervisor told him he only had
one day of vacation left, and that was all he could take. Claimant
stated that if he caught a deer on Monday, he would be back
Tuesday; otherwise he would return on Wednesday. His supervisor
told him if he did not return on Tuesday the supervisor would be
forced to take action, but did not specify what that action would
be. A fellow employee, Matuzak, also asked for the time off, but
was told he had no vacation time left and so could not go.
Claimant did not come to work on Tuesday, November 3, 1981, nor
did he call in either Monday or Tuesday to confirm that he would
not be in. Matuzak was also absent Monday and Tuesday without
calling in. When claimant reported to work on Wednesday, November
4, 1981, he was fired.
Hahn Manufacturing Company has a stated policy, posted over the
time clock, that an employee who is absent one day without calling
in will be suspended one week. Absent two days without calling in
would result in a termination.
Claimant was initially denied unemployment benefits and appealed
to a referee. The referee conducted a hearing and affirmed the
administrator's decision to deny benefits. The referee's reason for
denying benefits states, in part:
"The facts set forth above show that the claimant was discharged
for extending his vacation to two days after he had been told that
the company would only grant him one day off and that he was
expected back at work the following day. While the company policy
stating that an employee would be suspended one week following the
first instance of an absence without reporting off was not
followed, this situation was more serious than the usual one since
it involved two employees acting in concert after they had both
been told in advance that the claimant must be back by Tuesday and
that Matuzak's request had been denied."
After the board of review denied any further administrative
appeal, {*433} claimant appealed to the court of common
pleas. The court reversed the referee's decision finding that
decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. The
court stated that the employer's action in discharging claimant for
taking an extra day off violated the employer's own rule that such
conduct results in a one-week suspension, and that the misconduct
of another employee cannot be added to claimant's conduct to
constitute just cause sufficient to deny a claimant his
unemployment benefits.
From this decision, the respondents appeal.
"I. The trial court failed to make appropriate findings of fact
and conclusions of law."
Appellants filed their brief on August 8, 1983. The court, while
granting appellants' request for findings of fact and conclusions
of law on June 13, 1983, did not file them until August 19, 1983.
While this delay in filing may have inconvenienced appellants, we
cannot say it was prejudicial error requiring reversal.
Civ. R. 52 imposes no time limit on the court within which it
must file its findings. Here, appellants had several avenues open
to them to handle the late filing by the court. Appellants could
have requested an extension of time to file their brief until after
the findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed, under App.
R. 14(B). They could also have moved to amend or file supplemental
briefs once the findings and conclusions were filed, under App. R.
16(C). Also, appellants could have addressed the problems raised in
a reply brief, which they chose not to file.1
"II. The trial court erred in reversing the decision of the
board of review as the board's decision was lawful, reasonable and
not against the manifest weight of the evidence."
Only if a court of common pleas finds that the decision of the
board was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of
the evidence, can it reverse the decision. R.C. 4141.28(O). The
lower court did find the referee's decision to be against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Upon reviewing the transcript of
the hearing, the referee's decision, and the lower court's
findings, which are in the record before us, we find that the lower
court improperly reversed the referee's decision.
A major factor in the referee's decision to deny benefits was
his finding that this occurrence was more serious than a simple
absence since it involved two employees acting in concert, after
claimant was told to be back on Tuesday and Matuzak's request for
time off was denied. Such a finding cannot be said to be against
the manifest weight of the evidence presented at the hearing. In
dealing with a claim that the judgment is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, a reviewing court can reverse only if:
"'[T]he verdict is so manifestly contrary to the natural and
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence as to produce a
result in complete violation of substantial justice * * *.'"
Royer v. . Bd. of
Edn. (1977), 51 Ohio App. 2d 17, 20 [5 O.O.3d 138], citing
Jacobs v. . Benedict
(1973), 39Ohio App. 2d 141, 144 {*434}
[68 O.O.2d 343]. The evidence presented at the hearing supports a
finding that the termination was for good cause, which justifies
denying benefits. The board's decision to deny benefits cannot be
characterized as a violation of substantial justice. Therefore it
was error for the lower court to reverse the board's
decision.
The decision of the lower
court is reversed.
Judgment
reversed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
reversed.
DISSENT
PARRINO, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I concur in the majority's
decision on appellants' first assignment of error but respectfully
dissent from their determination of the second assignment of
error.
When a hearing is had before
the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, unemployment benefits may
be denied where it is established that the employee was fired for
just cause. The absence or existence of just cause for appellee's
termination is the issue in this appeal.
The record in this case shows
that appellee was an excellent employee.
The stated policy of the
employer displayed in a notice above the time clock was that a
one-day absence without notice would result in a one-week
suspension and a two-day absence would result in termination. The
administrator's decision indicates that appellee was absent without
notice for one day. Nothing in the record shows that appellee was
warned that he would be fired if he took two days off. Appellee had
only one day of vacation time remaining. In addition the record
does not show that appellee was told that he would be fired if he
took two days off with Matuzak.
In my opinion it was
unreasonable and arbitrary to couple Matuzak's actions with those
of appellee to intensify the "seriousness" of appellee's conduct.
Matuzak had no vacation time coming and had an extremely bad work
record. To penalize appellee for Matuzak's poor work record was
unjustified.
Even though it may have been
unwise for appellee to take two days off instead of one, it must
have been apparent to him that the likely result, according to the
clearly announced company policy, would be that he would receive a
one-week suspension rather than be discharged. It is reasonable to
assume that an employer, in dealing with his employees, would apply
the specific provisions of its own policy.
Under the facts in this case I
believe that appellee was fired without just cause and that
appellee is entitled to receive unemployment benefits. R.C.
4141.29(D)(2)(a).
Accordingly, I find that the
trial court correctly determined that the administrative decision
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
I would affirm.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 Additionally, we are not sure Civ. R. 52 applies to appeals to
common pleas court from administrative proceedings concerning
unemployment claims since the lower court acts as an appellate
court, reviewing the record which was before the board of review.
No trial de novo is held, so no "questions of fact
are tried by the court without a jury" as Civ. R. 52 specifies.
Here, whether it was required to or not, the court agreed to make
such findings. However, as discussed above, the delay in so doing
cannot be deemed prejudicial.