Howard Fields, Claimant-Appellant,

vs.

Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Et

Al., Appellees

No. 1-86-37
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT, ALLEN COUNTY
Slip Opinion
August 20, 1987, Decided

Administrative Appeal from Common Pleas Court.

 COUNSEL

 

MR. GREGORY M. NOVAK Attorney at Law for Claimant-Appellant.
MR. FRANK B. CORY Attorney at Law for Appellee, Ford Motor Company.
MR. ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE, JR. Attorney General for Appellee, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.

 JUDGES

 

GUERNSEY,* J., COLE, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.
 AUTHOR: GUERNSEY

 OPINION

 

 

 
GUERNSEY, J. This is an appeal by the claimant-appellant, Howard Fields, from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County affirming a decision of the appellee Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, denying claimant's application to institute further appeal from the affirmance by its referee of a decision of the appellee Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services holding that the claimant was discharged for just cause by the appellee-employer, Ford Motor Company, and not entitled to unemployment compensation related to this discharge.

 

The general facts of the claimant's discharge are undisputed. Claimant was a long time employee of the Ford Motor Company working at its engine plant located at Lima, Ohio. As such he belonged to, and was represented in many of his relationships with his employer by, Local 1219 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). By an agreement renegotiated during the July 1984 and October 1984 period, in full force and effect at all times pertinent herein, the union, on behalf of its membership, and the employer agreed, among many other things, as follows (p. 70 of agreement):

 

"FOREIGN AUTO PARKING

 

"A separate area will be established in the northeast corner of the North Hourly Parking Lot for those hourly employees who are driving 'foreign cars.' The parties will meet within 60 days following ratification to determine the definition of 'foreign cars.' Thereafter, a joint program will be established to encourage hourly employees to purchase Ford products and employees will have 60 days in which to drive an American vehicle onto the lot."

 

Thereafter the definition of "foreign cars" was established by conference between the union and the employer and the employees duly notified of such. The union and the employer treated the quoted clause of the agreement as prohibiting employees from parking a "foreign car" in any part of the employee parking lots surrounding its factory except "in the northeast corner of the North Hourly Parking Lot." On numerous occasions thereafter claimant Fields, who had notice of the provisions of the agreement, its construction and application, as evidenced by meetings, written warnings and disciplinary actions taken against him, parked his "foreign car" at some other than the prescribed place, resulting on some occasions in its being towed from the employer's premises. On six separate occasions claimant was suspended from work, but given the opportunity to return to work if he would agree to park his car in the appropriate area. On July 29, 1985, after claimant had persisted in violating the parking provisions, as so applied, he was discharged from employment by appellee company, but given reinstatement privileges for 60 days. Fields did not comply for reinstatement and filed his claim for unemployment benefits, thus initiating the proceedings from which this appeal resulted.

 

Appellant Fields assigns error in three particulars:

 

"I. Whether the provision in the contract * * * that forces a worker who owns a foreign made automobile to park in a designated area is binding when the provision denies the worker a constitutionally guaranteed liberty.

 

"II. The decision of the Board of Review * * * is against the weight of the evidence.

 

"III. Appellant was denied his due process of law throughout the entire grievance procedure by not having the representation of the union."

 

The thrust of the claimant's first assignment of error as stated in his brief is that claimant, "has the right to purchase and drive any automobile that he chooses," which "[n]either Ford Motor Company nor anyone else can take that constitutional right away from him."

 

It matters not whether we do nor do not agree with claimant's constitutional contention for on the facts of this case, the right of claimant to purchase and drive any automobile he chooses is not involved. The employer's actions did not purport to infringe on such claimed right. The only issue raised by the facts relates to the right of the employer to require its employees who drive "foreign cars" onto the employer's premises to park them in an area different than the areas assigned to employees who do not drive such cars onto the employer's premises. That issue is not raised or treated by this assignment of error and the assignment of error is thus found without merit.

 

The second assignment of error deals only with the weight of the evidence in support of the Board of Review's decision through its referee that claimant was discharged from his employment for just cause. As aptly stated by Judge Rumer in his decision filed in support of the lower court's judgment, "[d]etermining whether just cause exists in a particular case depends upon the unique factual considerations of the case, and this determination is primarily within the province of the referee and the Board," "that the fact reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the reversal of the Board's decision." Here there was undisputed evidence in the record of the agreement between the employer and the union, on behalf of the claimant and all other employees, that a "[s]eparate area will be established in the northeast corner of the North Hourly Parking Lot for those hourly employees who are driving 'foreign cars';" that the parties thereupon determined the definition of "foreign cars" and the parking area was established; that the employees were given sufficient notice of same; that both the employer and the union, for the employees, were consistent in their understanding and application of the agreement; that claimant had general notice of the agreement and its enforcement and specific notice of same through enforcement procedures taken against him prior to the culmination of his violations in discharge; that the policy of the employer, as confirmed by the agreement, was within the valid legal interests of the employer; that the provision dealing with a sixty day joint counseling program to encourage purchase of American cars was merely incidental and parellel to the parking requirements and did not lessen or vitiate the enforcement of the parking requirements immediately upon the establishment of the definition of "foreign cars" and the location of the parking area for workers driving such cars upon his employer's premises; and that, in all these circumstances, the claimant's conduct, evidenced by his repeated and flagrant violations, constituted insubordination and just cause for his discharge.

 

We find that the decision of the Board of Review, as reviewed and affirmed by the lower court, was not against the weight of the evidence, and that the second assignment of error is without merit.

 

Under the third assignment of error the claimant asserts inaction of the part of the Union as an implication of bad faith and an arbitrary disregard for a meritorious grievance, resulting in denial to claimant of his due process right of representation by the Union.

 

Although the record contains a copy of the "Local Agreements between Local 1219 United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)," admitted into evidence by the referee, such local agreements do not set forth applicable grievance procedures between the employees and employer. The record is, therefore, silent as to such procedures and further silent as to any matters connected therewith which would constitute, by some failure of union representation of claimant, an error prejudicial to the claimant in these unemployment compensation proceedings so as to deprive the right of the employer to discharge the employee for just cause. In short, though the claimant may have some complaint against his union to lodge in an appropriate tribunal, it is not a right which has been raised here in any manner as to require a determination in favor of the claimant and against his employer. We find the third assignment of error without merit.

 

Having found no error prejudicial to the claimant the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County is affirmed.

 DISPOSITION
 

Judgment affirmed.
 

JUDGES FOOTNOTES

 

 

 
* (GUERNSEY, J., retired, of the Third Appellate District, was assigned to active duty pursuant to Section 6(C), Article IV, Constitution.)