JAMIE S. JESSE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

ROBERTA STEINBACHER, ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU OF

EMPLOYMENT SERVICES and THE KROGER COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees

No. C-850660
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, HAMILTON COUNTY
Slip Opinion
July 9, 1986

Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas; Judgment Appealed from is Affirmed.

 COUNSEL

 

Legal Aid Society of Cincinnati, Mr. R. Collins Owens III of counsel, 901 Elm Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Messrs. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Richard H. Lippert and Mark Evans, 35 East Seventh Street, Suite 400, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Defendant-Appellee Steinbacher.

 OPINION

 

 

 
PER CURIAM.

 

This cause came on to be heard upon the appeal, the transcript of the docket, journal entries and original papers from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, the transcript of the proceedings, the two assignments of error, the briefs and the arguments of counsel.

 

In her two assignments of error, the plaintiff-appellant, Jamie S. Jesse, alleges that the decision of the Board of Review of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services denying her application for unemployment benefits was against the manifest weight of the evidence and was unlawful and unreasonable and that the trial court erred in not so finding. The essence of Jesse's argument is that she was entitled to unemployment benefits because she quit her job as a sacker with the Kroger Company for "just cause," as that phrase is used in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). She contends that she resigned her position because she was suffering from the illness of alcoholism, but she was unable to articulate this specific reason for her resignation at the time because she was confused and was not cognizant of the nature of her problem until she underwent treatment.

 

Prior to March 19, 1984, Jesse's attendance record at her place of employment was sporadic. On that date, she conferred with her supervisor, Betty Ruffin, in the presence of a union steward> and admitted that she knew her attendance was poor, expressing a fear that she would be "written up" because of her frequent absences. T.p. 20. She explained that she was having "personal problems" and felt that she "needed psychological help." T.p. 5. She did not specify alcoholism as the root of her problems; she contends that she had not yet admitted this fact to herself, and she presented an expert who testified before the referee that this stage of denial is common to alcoholics. T.p. 17-18.

 

Ruffin offered Jesse a leave of absence from work to bring her problems under control, but Jesse declined the offer. She asserts that she did not really want to risk fighting off her urge to drink alone at home at that point and thought a "sense of involvement" with her job would provide a better defense. T.p. 5. Nevertheless, she failed to show up for work until ten days later, when she informed Ruffin she no longer wanted her job and requested her back pay. She testified that she had still not admitted her alcoholism at this time and that she felt confused, disoriented and on the verge of a nervous breakdown but was unaware of the consequences of her actions. T.p. 7.

 

On April 1, 1984, Jesse entered a detoxification center at the urging of her father and remained there for a week. She received follow-up psychological therapy after her release and presented a letter from her psychologist stating that at the time Jesse's employment was terminated, her alcoholism prevented her from being able either to cope with a job or to make rational decisions.

 

While recovering at her parents' home, Jesse tried unsuccessfully to get back her job with Kroger. When her efforts failed, she applied for unemployment benefits. The administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services found that she had quit her employment without just cause and declared her ineligible for benefits under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), which provides:

 

(D) * * * [N]o individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions:

 

* * *

 

(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that:

 

(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work, * * *

 

A hearing was held before a referee of the Bureau's Board of Review, who found that the administrator properly disallowed Jesse's claim. Jesse appealed to the court of common pleas in accordance with the provisions of R.C. 4141.28(0),1 and that court affirmed the board's decision, finding that it "was not unlawful, unreasonable or contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence."T.d. 9. She now alleges in her appeal to this court that that finding was erroneous. We disagree for the following reasons.

 

Jesse first alleges that the board's finding that she left her employment without just cause was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In the case of a challenge to the factual basis of a decision of the board, review by the court of common pleas and by this court is limited to a determination of whether the evidence in the record supports the decision. Reversal will not be warranted merely because the reviewing court's interpretation of that evidence is at odds with the board's conclusion and will not be ordered if the decision of the board is supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the dispute. Wittenmyer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Nov. 20, 1985), Seneca App. No. 13-84-23, unreported; Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 159, 463 N.E.2d 1280, paragraph two of the syllabus.

 

Jesse also asserts, in her second assignment of error, that the board's finding of no just cause was unlawful and unreasonable. Analysis of this issue is intertwined with the determination of whether the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, because a decision is unreasonable if the factual findings "are not based on relevant probative evidence." Cunningham v. Jerry Spears Co. (1963), 119 Ohio App. 169, 175, 197 N.E.2d 810, 814.

 

Furthermore, both the weight of the evidence inquiry and the question of whether the board's decision was unlawful hinge on the definition of "just cause." The existence of just cause either for leaving a job or for discharging an employee must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, the test being whether an ordinarily intelligent person would consider the challenged action taken by the employee or employer to be justified. Wittenmyer, supra; Angelkovski, supra, paragraph four of the syllabus; Peyton v. Sun T.V. & Appliances (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 10, 335 N.E.2d 751.

 

Jesse argues that this test must be tailored in the instant case to certain recognized characteristics of a person suffering from alcoholism. Under this approach, the question to be addressed would be whether an ordinarily intelligent person suffering from alcoholism would consider Jesse's action justifiable. Jesse contends that, given the fact that alcoholics commonly deny or fail to recognize the nature of their condition in its early stages, her failure to specify alcoholism as the reason for quitting her job was compatible with expected behavior and did not render her departure unjustifiable. Furthermore, her decision to decline her supervisor's offer of a leave of absence resulted from a state of confusion and disorientation brought on by her alcoholism and thus was also justified under the circumstances. Therefore, she asserts, it was error for the board to find she quit her job without just cause.

 

We agree that the fact that an individual suffers from the illness of alcoholism is a factor to be considered in determining whether there was just cause for terminating her employment. However, we do not thereby pronounce that any impetuous, impulsive or irrational course of action embarked upon by one who is in the throes of a denial of reality, whether brought on by alcoholism or any other disease, physical or mental, must necessarily be acknowledged as an exception to the ordinary rule of just cause. >The test remains whether an ordinarily intelligent person would find the action justified. In the case of an alcoholic, the question is one of degree: to what extent may behavior be impaired by the illness and still fall within the range of the just cause standard? Clearly, a formula tolerating all extremes of alcoholic behavior would be unacceptable. See Tolbert v. Board of Review (February 28, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 48639, unreported. While it would imply recognition of the classification of this condition as a potentially debilitating illness, it would deny the role that self-motivation must necessarily play in dealing with the illness, see Wittenmyer, supra, and would undermine the goal of encouraging continued employment wherever possible. See Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co. (1946), 146 Ohio St. 559, 570, 67 N.E.2d 439, 445; Goldman v. Giles (December 27, 1977), Hamilton App. No. C-76718, unreported. Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Jesse's actions, even though they may comprise typical alcoholic behavior, met the statutory criterion of just cause.

 

It remained for the trier of fact to weigh the testimonial and documentary evidence before it in determining whether just cause existed. The referee found that Jesse's reasons for leaving Kroger were "undisclosed by the record" and that, although Jesse later asserted medical grounds for her departure, there was no evidence that she left upon advice of medical personnel. Relying on Goldman, supra, the referee found that since there was no disclosure of the medical problem to the employer and no acceptance of the accommodation offered by the employer, there was no just cause for Jesse to quit her employment. The referee's factual findings were based on relevant probative evidence, mainly the testimony of Jesse and Ruffin, her superior, and thus were reasonable. His conclusion that Jesse left Kroger without just cause was based on competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the dispute. Therefore, the court of common pleas properly found that the board's decision was not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

 

Judgment affirmed.

 

SHANNON, P.J., BLACK and HILDEBRANDT, JJ.

 OPINION FOOTNOTES

 

 

 
1 R.C. 4141.28(0) provides in part:

 

Any interested party * * * may, within thirty days after notice of the decision of the board was mailed to the last known post office address of all interested parties, appeal from the decision of the board to the court of common pleas of the county wherein the appellant, if an employee, is resident or was last employed or of the county wherein the appellant, if an employer, is resident or has his principal place of business in this state.

 

* * *

 

If the court finds that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse and vacate such decision or it may modify such decision and enter final judgment in accordance with such modification; otherwise such court shall affirm such decision. Any interested party shall have the right to appeal from the decision of the court as in civil cases.