PEYTON,
APPELLANT,
vs.
SUN T.V. & APPLIANCES ET
AL., APPELLEES
No. 74AP-454
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, FRANKLIN
COUNTY
335 N.E.2d 751, 44 Ohio App. 2d 10, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 8
February 11, 1975, Decided
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- R. C. 4141.29(D) (2) (a) --
Voluntary job resignation by employee -- Benefits payable, when --
Position obtained through own efforts after layoff from regular job
-- Employee not capable of performing work.
SYLLABUS
An applicant for unemployment compensation may not be denied
benefits, pursuant to R. C. 4141.29(D) (2) (a), where he resigned a
position obtained -- under emergency conditions and through his own
efforts -- as a result of being layed off from his regular job, and
such resignation was induced by his obvious incompatibility with
the work he was performing.
COUNSEL
Mr. William J. Abraham, for appellant.
Mr. William J. Brown, Attorney General,
Mr. John F. Livorno and Mr. Raymond A.
Stegmeier, for appellees.
JUDGES
REILLY, J. TROOP, P. J., and WHITESIDE, J., concur.
AUTHOR: REILLY
OPINION
{*11} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio. The record indicates that on
November 1, 1973, William Peyton, filed an application for
unemployment benefits. The Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, on
November 16, 1973, allowed the claim, finding he was not excluded
by R. C. 4141.29(D) (2)(a), but quit for just cause. Sun T.V. &
Appliances sought a reconsideration and obtained a reversal of the
initial allowance. Peyton timely appealed to the board of review.
There was a hearing before a referee, and the decision, upon
reconsideration, was affirmed. Ultimately, the board of review
affirmed the referee's decision. The board's decision was appealed
to the Court of Common Pleas and affirmed; whereupon, this appeal
was perfected, and the following advanced as the assignment of
error:
"The Trial Court erred in affirming the decision of the Board of
Review, State of Ohio, Bureau of Employment Services, which
decision was contrary to law, unreasonable, and against the
manifest weight of the evidence."
Mr. Peyton was employed by Rockwell International Corporation as
a factory employee for approximately twenty-one years. He lost his
job because of a general layoff, due to the cancellation of
government contracts. At the time of his termination, he was
earning approximately two hundred dollars per week. Then, he found
employment with Sun T.V. as a salesman, and was paid by a
commission for individual sales.
The plain fact was that he was unable to earn enough for
necessary family expenses. He was not only facing financial
hardship, but probable bankruptcy. His entire work experience,
aside from some secondary real estate background, was basically
different from sales and promotional merchandising. Hence, Mr.
Peyton, in net effect, left his employment to find work for which
he was reasonably adapted. He applied for unemployment benefits
while seeking a job. Specifically, R. C. 4141.29 (D)(2)(a) reads,
in pertinent part:
"(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual
may * * * be paid benefits under the following conditions: * *
*
{*12} "(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the
administrator finds that:
"(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged
for just cause in connection with his work. * * *"
The claimant asserts that he quit his work with just cause. This
is the issue in the case. There is, of course, not a slide-rule
definition of just cause. Essentially, each case must be considered
upon its particular merits. Traditionally, just cause, in the
statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent
person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular
act. Moreover, there is minimal case law directly determining this
issue. Therefore, we are considering this case upon its individual
merits. It is noteworthy that Mr. Peyton's consistent employment
record scarcely reflects any malingering or abuse of the system.
When he lost his job, after twenty-one years of steady employment,
he immediately sought and found other work. The true result was a
postponement of the time of eligibility for unemployment benefits,
for, undoubtedly, he could have had benefits from his North
American Rockwell employment. It is noteworthy that he did not
simply apply for unemployment compensation. Instead, he went out
and found a job. The ultimate difficulty was that he was not suited
for that kind of work and could not make a living doing it. The
intent of the law is not to penalize a person for not finding work.
Therefore, we find, as a matter of law, appellant had just cause
for leaving his job. Accordingly, the assignment of error is well
taken and sustained. The judgment of the trial court is reversed
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
Judgment reversed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
reversed.