MARVIN,
APPELLANT,
vs.
GILES, ADMR., ET AL.,
APPELLEES
No. C-820854
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, HAMILTON
COUNTY
463 N.E.2d 80, 11 Ohio App. 3d 57, 11 Ohio B. Rep. 91
July 27, 1983, Decided
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- Constitutional law -- First
Amendment -- Free Exercise Clause -- Quitting employment because of
an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by claimant's
religion -- Benefits allowed, when.
SYLLABUS
In determining whether an applicant for unemployment benefits who
quit his employment because of his religious beliefs is entitled to
receive benefits pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), the narrow
function of a reviewing court is to determine whether there was an
appropriate finding that the applicant terminated his employment
because of an honest conviction based upon his religion.
(Thomas v. . Review Bd. of
the Indiana Employment
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, applied.)
COUNSEL
Mr. Michael J. Mooney, Mr. John Schrider and
Cincinnati Legal Aid Society, for appellant.
Mr. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney
general, and Mr. Richard H. Lippert, for appellee
Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.
Messrs. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister and
Mr. Mark J. Stepaniak, for appellee Federal Home
Loan Bank of Cincinnati.
JUDGES
KEEFE, P.J. BLACK, J., concurs. KLUSMEIER, J., concurs
separately.
AUTHOR: KEEFE
OPINION
{*58} Appellant Sammie L. Marvin applied for unemployment
benefits on January 13, 1981. Although he was living in Alabama at
the time he filed for benefits, his employment had occurred in Ohio
so that the matter was processed in Ohio as an interstate claim.
The fact that it was such a claim presents no issue before us. His
application was consistently disallowed through his numerous
administrative appeals, ending on January 6, 1982, with a unanimous
decision by the three members of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review disallowing any further administrative review. On
January 29, 1982, he filed his notice of appeal in the court of
common pleas which denied his appeal finding that the ultimate
decision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review "was
not unlawful, unreasonable or contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence."
The statement of facts as structured by the appellant in his
brief is faithful to the evidence in the record. Marvin stopped
working for his employer, appellee Federal Home Loan Bank of
Cincinnati ("the bank"), on November 28, 1980, after almost seven
years of employment with the bank and a total of fourteen years of
continuous employment since his graduation from high school. At the
bank he was the manager of the check processing area, was making in
excess of $ 25,000 a year, and was scheduled to be promoted to
assistant treasurer. On February 25, 1979, while attending the
Bibleway Church of God in Christ's Church at 3231 Woodburn Avenue,
Cincinnati, Ohio, Marvin, according to his sworn testimony, had a
religious experience and was told by God to return to his home in
Alabama within two years to help raise his deceased sister's six
children. He did resign from the bank, went to Alabama, attempted
to secure employment, could not, and applied for unemployment
compensation.> Throughout the entire administrative proceedings,
Marvin's claim was disallowed because it was held that he quit his
work without just cause under the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
Law.
Although somewhat duplicative of material already contained
herein, we nevertheless include the following portions of the
official decision of the hearing referee, Kenneth A. Horney, acting
for the board of review:
"The claimant filed his initial interstate claim on January 13,
1981 in Montgomery, Alabama. * * *
"Prior to filing the above-mentioned claim, the claimant worked
for Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati from February 14, 1974 to
November 28, 1980, when he resigned. The claimant had a vision and
was instructed by God to relocate to Alabama to help in a family
situation. He was to assist his brother-in-law in the raising of
six children after the death of the children's mother, the
claimant's sister.
"Law applicable: Sections 4141.29(D)(2)(a) and (G), Revised Code
of Ohio.
"The claimant may have had a good {*59} personal reason
for quitting his employment; becoming totally unemployed; and
relocating to another state, but not a reason recognized as 'just
cause' under the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law. * * *"
The administrator's file, a part of the record now before us,
contains a letter addressed to the Ohio Bureau of Employment
Services on appellant's behalf from the president of the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati. It states in part:
"Mr. Marvin is a deeply religious man. The depth of his
religious conviction is apparent in his stated reason for filing
the reconsideration request. Mr. Marvin has stated he left the Bank
because he believes his religious obligations have forced him to
leave Cincinnati and return to Alabama. I believe Sam is completely
sincere in making this statement and that he felt no less an
obligation to take this action than would someone who left their [
sic ] employment because their [
sic ] position conflicted with their [
sic ] religious observances."
Although appellant propounds two assignments of error, in
essence they contain the identical remonstration: the court of
common pleas erred in finding that the decision of the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review was not unlawful, unreasonable or
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The same argument
is made for both assignments, viz., that appellant
quit for religious reasons and the disallowance of unemployment
benefits, therefore, is erroneous under both state law and the
United States Constitution, specifically religious freedom under
the First Amendment.1
First, we move to examine any pronouncements by the United
States Supreme Court which apply. We fully recognize that the
matter sub judice is not the run-of-the-mill
unemployment compensation case. We need not highlight or emphasize
its unordinary aspects. Thomas v. . Review
Bd. of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1981),
450 U.S. 707, concerns a Jehovah's Witness who was initially hired
to work in his employer's foundry which fabricated sheet steel for
a variety of industrial uses, but when the foundry was closed he
was transferred to a department that fabricated turrets for
military tanks. He quit, asserting that his religious beliefs
prevented him from participating in the production of weapons. The
Indiana Employment Security Review Board ("the board") denied
Thomas' claim for unemployment compensation, and claimant appealed.
The Indiana Court of Appeals ordered the board to extend benefits
to claimant Thomas. The Supreme Court of Indiana, dividing three to
two, vacated the decision of the court of appeals and denied the
claimant benefits. The United States Supreme Court held that
Indiana's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to claimant
violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion. In Thomas, the review board, like the
referee (in Indiana), found that Thomas had left his job for
religious reasons, and the following language is the United States
Supreme Court's reference thereto:
"* * * The referee concluded nonetheless that Thomas'
termination was not based upon a 'good cause [arising] in
connection with [his] work,' as required by the Indiana
unemployment compensation statute. Accordingly, he was held not
entitled to benefits. The Review Board adopted the referee's
findings and conclusions, {*60} and affirmed the denial of
benefits." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 712.
While the facts in Thomas are not identical to
those here, nevertheless, the similarity is marked. Thomas quit due
to his religious convictions. The only reasonable interpretation
which can be made of the hearing referee's findings here is that
Sammie L. Marvin quit or "resigned" because he "had a vision and
was instructed by God to relocate to Alabama to help in a family
situation," a decree which the record demonstrates was given to him
while attending a formal service in the church of his choice. If
there was a religious conviction in Thomas, as the
Supreme Court held, a religious conviction is present here on the
part of Marvin. The referee in effect recognized that Marvin may
have had a good personal reason for quitting his employment, but
concluded that a "good personal reason" is not enough for benefits
under Ohio law. A "good personal reason" unassociated with
a religious conviction ordinarily would not be sufficient
to justify the allowance of unemployment benefits. However, if
there is a true religious conviction present, benefits cannot be
withheld even if the religious conviction may also be categorized
as a personal conviction. Here, the finding of a "good personal
reason" did not eliminate what amounted to a finding of religious
conviction.2
In Thomas, Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the eight justice majority, declared:
"Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to
the exercise of religion. Sherbert v. .
Verner [(1963), 374 U.S. 398], supra;
Wisconsin v. . Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-216 (1972). The determination of what is a 'religious' belief
or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task,
as the division in the Indiana Supreme Court attests. However, the
resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial
perception of the particular belief or practice in question;
religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at
713-714.
"* * * Where the state conditions receipt of an important
benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon
religion {*61} exists. While the compulsion may be
indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.
"* * *
"* * * [I]t is still true that '[t]he essence of all that has
been said and written on the subject is that only those interests
of the highest order * * * can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion.' Wisconsin v. .
Yoder, supra, at 215." Id. at
717-718.
Appellant Marvin cannot be denied the benefits due him. We
sustain both assignments of error, reverse the judgment of the
court of common pleas, and enter the judgment which that court
should have awarded, viz., that the decision of
the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is unlawful and that
the appellant is entitled to such unemployment compensation (for
time in covered employment) as is authorized under the laws of Ohio
since appellant terminated his employment because of his religious
convictions. Thomas v. . Review Bd. of the
Indiana Employment Security Division, supra.
Judgment reversed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
reversed.
CONCURRENCE
KLUSMEIER, J., concurring.
I concur by separate writing in order to emphasize our adherence
to the appropriate scope of review as contained in R.C. 4141.28(O)
and to express concern over the burden placed on the triers of fact
to determine the bona fide beliefs of applicants for unemployment
compensation who assign religious motivation to their acts of
terminating employment or refusal to accept employment.
In Sherbert v. . Verner
(1963), 374 U.S. 398, the Supreme Court afforded some indication,
albeit obiter dictum, that there may be some limit
to the effective assertion of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment in unemployment compensation cases. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, stated, "* * * [n]or do we, by our
decision today, declare the existence of a constitutional right to
unemployment benefits on the part of all persons whose religious
convictions are the cause of their unemployment. * * *"
Sherbert, supra, at 409-410. The
Thomas decision was reached in the light of prior
decisions of the Supreme Court "particularly
Sherbert v. . Verner." Thomas v.
. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Security
Division (1981), 450 U.S. 707, at 713. In that light the
Supreme Court held that "* * * [c]ourts should not undertake to
dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is
'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not
articulated with the clarity and precision that a more
sophisticated person might employ." Thomas, supra,
at 715. Although courts should refrain from such dissection, it is
just such critical analysis that is imposed on the administrative
agencies below.
Because our narrow function is to determine whether there was an
appropriate finding that the appellant terminated his work because
of an honest conviction that his religion commanded it, and the
facts so found and the conclusions drawn must appear in the record,
it follows that the triers of fact must be able to articulate those
findings and conclusions notwithstanding the subjective nature of
the evidence.
The act of an employee quitting work without just cause
disqualifies him from receiving unemployment compensation. R.C.
4141.29(D)(2)(a). "Just cause," as that term is used in this
connection, is that circumstance "* * * which, to an ordinarily
intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing
a particular act. * * *" Peyton v. . Sun
T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 10, 12 [73 O.O. 218]. The
presence or absence of just cause is to be determined on the
individual facts of each case.
{*62} The reason for quitting his employment, as
assigned by appellant, being the compulsion of religious
obligation, is uncontroverted in the record and therefore the
conclusion that he quit without just cause is unlawful and mandates
the reversal of the decision of the board of review.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 Appellee administrator notes that appellant did not raise his
constitutional argument before the board of review or state it in
his notice of appeal to the court of common pleas. However,
appellant correctly and timely did raise his
constitutional argument in his assignments of error filed with the
court of common pleas in compliance with R.C. 4141.28 (O).
2 We are not blind to the possibility of charlatans unlawfully
faking religious beliefs for their own nefarious purposes. This
possibility makes the determination of what is a religious belief
or practice "a difficult and delicate task" as the United States
Supreme Court recognized in
Thomas. Id. at 714. The
roles of hearing referees and review boards are extremely important
in this respect. Findings should report attempted deception or
fakery when discerned. There is no suggestion of chicanery in the
Thomas case, nor here. Contrariwise, the
administrative record tends to demonstrate Marvin's religious
sincerity. In Thomas, the referee categorically
reported that the claimant quit due to his religious convictions,
and in the matter sub judice the referee in effect
came to a similar result, viz., that Marvin
resigned because God told him to go to Alabama to assist with the
raising of his dead sister's children. In Thomas,
the opinion states that:
"The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to
determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner
terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work
was forbidden by his religion. * * *" Id. at
716.
Claimant-appellant's testimony was taken in Alabama on a
cassette tape and sent to Ohio where the hearing referee listened
to it and had it transcribed. No appellate argument in any way
questions this procedure, and I introduce no noteworthy
significance to it.