DAVIS,
APPELLANT,
vs.
MARION COUNTY ENGINEER
, APPELLEE
No. 90-561
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
573 N.E.2d 51, 60 Ohio St. 3d 53
May 29, 1991, Decided
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for
Marion County, No. 9-87-60.
HEADNOTE
Public employment -- Public employee may rescind or
withdraw a tender of resignation at any time prior to its effective
date, when -- Acceptance of a tender of resignation from public
employment occurs, when.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. A public employee may rescind or withdraw a tender of
resignation at any time prior to its effective date, so long as the
public employer has not formally accepted such tender of
resignation.
2. Acceptance of a tender of resignation from public employment
occurs where the public employer or its designated agent initiates
some type of affirmative action, preferably in writing, that
clearly indicates to the employee that the tender of resignation is
accepted by the employer.
On Friday, April 3, 1987, plaintiff-appellant, James G. Davis,
tendered a letter of resignation from his employment as a highway
supervisor to his employer, defendant-appellee, Marion County
Engineer. The letter stated that plaintiff's resignation was to be
effective April 10, 1987 at 4:30 p.m., and that the resignation was
for personal reasons (i.e., because his wife and
mother-in-law were both ill, and he could not find anyone to care
for them). While the Marion County Engineer, Jack Tozzer, urged
plaintiff to carefully consider his decision, plaintiff submitted
the letter of resignation and upon Tozzer's request recommended two
possible replacements for his position. Tozzer testified that he
interviewed three persons to fill plaintiff's position on the day
the resignation was tendered, and that he interviewed six more
people on the following Monday.
On the following Monday, April 6, plaintiff told Tozzer that he
had changed his mind and that he wanted to keep his job. Tozzer
refused to accept plaintiff's attempt to withdraw his resignation.
On April 8, 1987, plaintiff tendered a letter to Tozzer withdrawing
his resignation and expressing a desire to remain employed with the
Marion County Engineer's Office. Tozzer again refused to permit
plaintiff to withdraw his resignation. Plaintiff continued to work
through April 10, 1987 and returned to work on April 13, 1987,
whereupon he attended a supervisor's meeting. Plaintiff testified
that he thought he had his job back, but Tozzer told plaintiff at
that time that he was no longer employed with the engineer's
office. On April 20, 1987, defendant hired a replacement for
plaintiff's position.
Pursuant to R.C. 124.03, plaintiff filed an appeal with the
State Personnel Board of Review ("PBR"). A hearing was held on June
25, 1987 before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Subsequently,
the PBR adopted the report and recommendation of the ALJ, and
ordered that plaintiff be reinstated to his former position with
defendant.> The PBR relied upon State, ex rel.
Staley, v. Lakewood (1934), 47 Ohio App.
519, 192 N.E. 180, and Babbitt v.
Shade (1938), 60 Ohio App. 100, 13 O.O. 447, 19
N.E.2d 778, while finding the decision of State, ex rel.
Orr, v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (1912), 23
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 98, 34 Ohio C.D. 140, to be unnecessarily
restrictive. It was also noted that Orr was
decided prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act.
Pursuant to R.C. 119.12, defendant appealed the order of the PBR
to the court of common pleas. In a journal entry dated November 24,
1987, the trial court vacated the order of the PBR as being not in
accordance with law. In relevant part, the trial court opined that
"* * * the better rule is that set forth in Orr
and as followed in those jurisdiction [ sic ] that
adopt the common law rule."
Upon further appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of
a motion to certify the record.
COUNSEL
Stewart Jaffy & Associates, Stewart R.
Jaffy and Renny J. Tyson, for
appellant.
Jim Slagle, prosecuting attorney, for
appellee.
JUDGES
Sweeney, J. Douglas, H. Brown and Resnick, JJ., concur. Moyer,
C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. Wright and Holmes, JJ.,
separately dissent.
AUTHOR: SWEENEY
OPINION
{*54} This is a case of first impression before this
court. As noted in Annotation (1962), 82 A.L.R. 2d 750, 753, this
court has not yet considered in a written opinion the question of
whether, and under what circumstances, a public employee or officer
may withdraw his or her prospective resignation before its
effective date. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the
decision of the court of appeals below and reinstate the order of
the PBR.
The case law in Ohio within this area of the law is quite
sparse. In State, ex rel. Orr, v.
Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (1913), 87 Ohio St. 528, 102
N.E. 1133, this court affirmed without opinion the decision of the
Circuit Court of Cuyahoga County, which essentially held that a
public employee who resigned from office effective at a future date
could not withdraw such resignation absent the consent of the
accepting party. State, ex rel. Orr, v.
Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (1912), 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
98, 34 Ohio C.D. 140. However, as noted by plaintiff and the ALJ
below, Orr was decided prior to the implementation
of the civil service laws which created certain rights and
responsibilities unique to public employment. See 103 Ohio Laws
698-714 (1913). Under such circumstances, we believe that even if
Orr is entitled to some precedential value, it is
readily distinguishable from the cause sub
judice.
Subsequent to the creation of civil service in the state of Ohio
pursuant to Section 10, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution, an
Ohio appellate court had the opportunity to determine the
effectiveness of a withdrawal of resignation by a public employee
in State, ex rel. Staley, v.
Lakewood (1934), 47 Ohio App. 519, 192 N.E. 180.
In Staley, the court held that the public employee
was entitled to withdraw his resignation before the effective date,
since the public employee had not actually relinquished his
position. The Staley court found that a withdrawal
of resignation before its effective date is permissible even if the
withdrawal of resignation is "* * * against the will of the body to
which it is tendered and * * * accepted * * *. State, ex
rel. Ryan, v. Murphy * * * [(1908), 30
Nev. 409, 97 P. 391]." Id. at 525, 192 N.E. at
182.
In the case of Babbitt v.
Shade (1938), 60 Ohio App. 100, 13 O.O. 447, 19
N.E.2d 778, the Franklin County Court of Appeals upheld the
withdrawal of resignation of a public employee prior to its
effective date, even though it was accepted by the appointing
{*55} authority and even though the appointing authority
was opposed to the employee's continuance in public employment. The
court reasoned: "* * * we regard the Staley case
as a more logical presentation of the principles which, in our
judgment, should control than the Orr case * * *."
Id. at 103-104, 13 O.O. at 448-449, 19 N.E.2d at
780.
In State, ex rel. Kraft, v.
Massillon (1951), 89 Ohio App. 339, 46 O.O. 129,
102 N.E.2d 39, the Stark County Court of Appeals essentially held
that a withdrawal of resignation after the public employment was
actually relinquished would not be valid, and that the doctrine of
estoppel could be invoked against the public employee, since the
public employer relied upon the resignation and filled the vacancy
created thereby.
In addition to the foregoing Ohio cases, a review of cases from
other jurisdictions concerning a withdrawal of resignation from
public employment indicates that in the absence of a constitutional
or statutory provision to the contrary, "* * * the greater weight
of authority holds that the resignation of a public office cannot
take effect until it is accepted * * *." Annotation,
supra, at 751. While we find that
Staley and Babbitt come close to
articulating the standard which we envision as being the most
appropriate to apply in resignation withdrawal cases, we believe
that a more balanced rule of law is necessary in order to resolve
cases arising in this particular area of law -- one that is fair to
the employer as well as the employee.
In our view, the crucial factor in determining the legal
effectiveness of a withdrawal of resignation from public employment
prior to its effective date is the manner of acceptance conveyed by
the employer to the employee. In this vein, we are of the opinion
that acceptance of a tender of resignation from public employment
should be more than simply the receipt of the letter of
resignation. Acceptance of a resignation should be in writing, and
should encompass some type of affirmative act that clearly
indicates that the tender of resignation is accepted by someone
empowered by the public employer to do so. See
Reiter v. State, ex rel. (1894),
51 Ohio St. 74, 36 N.E. 943, paragraph one of the syllabus. Absent
acceptance in this manner, the public employee should be free to
withdraw his or her tender of resignation prior to its purported
effective date.
While the better practice for all concerned would require that
the tender of resignation, acceptance of resignation, or withdrawal
of resignation prior to acceptance be set forth in writing, we find
it would be unwise to totally foreclose any of these actions from
being accomplished orally. In cases or controversies involving an
oral tender, acceptance or withdrawal of resignation, clear and
convincing evidence must be proffered to support the validity of
such actions if performed in such manner. Thus, while the presence
of a memorandum or writing will undoubtedly assist a board or a
court in determining the legal effect of a tender, acceptance or
withdrawal of resignation from public employment, we wish to
underscore that a memorandum or writing of any of the foregoing
actions is not required, but merely preferred.
Therefore, we hold that a public employee may rescind or
withdraw a tender of resignation at any time prior to its effective
date, so long as the public employer has not formally accepted such
tender of resignation. We further hold that acceptance of a tender
of resignation from public employment occurs where the public
{*56} employer or its designated agent initiates some type
of affirmative action, preferably in writing, that clearly
indicates to the employee that the tender of resignation is
accepted by the employer.
In applying the foregoing standard to the instant cause, we
determine that the PBR acted properly in finding plaintiff's
withdrawal of resignation to be timely, and that such finding was,
pursuant to R.C. 119.12, supported by reliable, probative and
substantial evidence 0 and was in accordance with law. Thus, under
the facts developed herein, the courts below erred in reversing the
order of the PBR which essentially held plaintiff's withdrawal of
resignation to be legally effective, timely and equitable.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and
reinstate the order of the PBR.
Judgment reversed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
reversed.
DISSENT
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the syllabus. However, I dissent from the majority's
application of the syllabus to the facts of this case. The conduct
of appellee, the Marion County Engineer, upon being advised by
appellant that he was resigning from his job constitutes
"[a]cceptance of a tender of resignation from public employment"
because the engineer took the affirmative action of urging
appellant to carefully consider his decision, requested appellant's
recommendations for his replacement, and interviewed nine persons
to fill the vacancy created by appellant's resignation. It appears
that that conduct occurred before appellant changed his mind and
advised appellee that he wished to keep his job.
Because I believe the conduct of appellee "clearly indicate[d]
to the * * * [appellant] 1 that the tender of resignation * * *
[was] accepted," I would affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
HOLMES, J., dissenting.
I have no specific objection to the law pronounced by the
majority in its syllabus; it is only to its application to the
facts here that I object. As noted by Justice Wright in his
dissent, the facts presented here clearly show that the public
employer initiated an affirmative action which was obviously known
to this public employee, i.e., that the tender of
resignation of the public employee had been accepted by the public
employer.
WRIGHT, J., dissenting.
I concur with the syllabus law as propounded by the majority. I
dissent only because I believe the appellee county engineer did
what the majority said was required, i.e.,
initiate "some type of affirmative action * * * that clearly
indicates to the employee that the tender of resignation is
accepted by the employer."
Consider, if you will, the following actions taken by the
engineer after the appellant had handed in a
letter of resignation:
(1) He interviewed three prospective replacements that same
Friday and another six the following Monday; (2) he specifically
rejected the appellant's 2 request to withdraw his letter of
resignation on Monday; (3) two days later the appellant attempted
to give {*57} the engineer a letter withdrawing the
resignation and again the engineer refused to accept it.
It seems to me that interviewing replacements is about as clear
an indication of an impending vacancy as can be given. Just in case
the appellant missed the import of that activity -- though it would
have been hard to miss since he recommended two people to fill his
job -- the engineer twice told him that his
resignation had been accepted and could not be withdrawn. The
majority acknowledges, nay, it "underscores," the rule that formal
acceptance of a resignation need not be in writing. The majority
stops short, however, of providing some guidance as to what act, in
lieu of a letter, would constitute an affirmative action. Breaking
all the departing employee's pencils in front of the other staff
might suffice, though it seems childish. Perhaps it would be enough
if the employer starts interviewing replacements and tells the
employee that his resignation has been accepted and cannot be
withdrawn.