FULTON COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT
vs.
GILES, ADMR.,
OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, ET
AL.,
APPELLEES, ET AL.
No. 78-500
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
384 N.E.2d 287, 56 Ohio St. 2d 433, 10 Ohio Op. 3d 531
December 8, 1978, Decided
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for
Fulton County.
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- Denial of benefits -- Duration
of unemployment ended, when -- Requirement of working six weeks --
Applicability -- R. C. 4141.29(G), construed.
SYLLABUS
1. Pursuant to the provisions of R. C. 4141.29(G), a person who
quits work to marry and is, consequently, denied unemployment
compensation benefits because of the provisions of R. C.
4141.29(D)(2)(c), may end the "duration of his unemployment," and
thus again qualify for benefits in Ohio, if he "become[s]
reemployed in employment subject to * * * the unemployment
compensation act of another state," and while so employed "has
earned wages equal to one half of his average weekly wage or sixty
dollars, whichever is less."
2. The requirement of R. C. 4141.29(G) which, in effect,
provides that an individual shall have "worked six weeks" in order
to terminate the "duration of his unemployment" and thus requalify
for unemployment compensation in Ohio, has no application to those
persons whose prior separation from Ohio employment resulted from
those causes set out in R. C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 31, 1976, Linda Rainear, nee Netherland, resigned her
position as a teacher with the Fulton County Board of Education
(appellant) in order to marry and move to Michigan.
Thereafter she was employed as a substitute teacher by the
Midland Public Schools in Michigan. This employment continued over
a span of four weeks during which she earned $150.75. Upon
termination of that employment, she filed a claim for Ohio
unemployment compensation benefits. Her claim was allowed on the
basis of compliance with R. C. 4141.29(G) and was upheld by the
administrator (an appellee herein) upon reconsideration. On appeal
by the Fulton County Board of Education, the decision of the
administrator was upheld by the referee of the Board of Review.
Following the Board of Review's refusal to reconsider, the board of
education appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County.
The Court of Common Pleas reversed. The administrator and the Board
of Review appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed the Court
of Common Pleas.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of
appellant's motion to certify the record.
COUNSEL
Mr. William R. Swigart, prosecuting
attorney, and Mr. Greg W. Grover, for
appellant.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and
Mr. Jerry Arthur Jewett, for appellees Board of
Review and administrator.
JUDGES
LEACH, C.J., HERBERT, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN, SWEENEY and LOCHER,
JJ., concur. P. BROWN, J., dissents.
AUTHOR: LEACH
OPINION
{*434} R. C. 4141.29 provides, in pertinent part:
"(D) * * * no individual may * * * be paid benefits under the
following conditions:
"* * *
"(2) For the duration of his unemployment if
the administrator finds that:
". . .
"(c) Such individual quit work to marry * * *." (Emphasis
added.)
It is undisputed that Linda Rainear resigned her teaching
position with the Fulton County Board of Education in order to
marry. The single issue herein is whether {*435} she
complied with the requirements of R. C. 4141.29(G), which define
the duration of a person's unemployment. The import of this
definition is that when a person's "duration of * * * unemployment"
is ended, that person may again become eligible for benefits.
Appellees claim that by working as a substitute teacher in
Michigan and earning $150.75, Rainear ended her "duration of * * *
unemployment," as that phrase is defined in R. C. 4141.29(G), and
thereby became eligible for benefits in Ohio.
Subsection (G) states, in pertinent part:
"'Duration of his unemployment,' as used in this section, means
the full period of unemployment next ensuing after a separation
from any base period or subsequent work and until an
individual has become reemployed in employment subject
to sections 4141.01 to 4141.46 of the Revised Code,
or the unemployment compensation act of another
state, or of the United States, and until
such individual has worked six weeks and has earned wages equal to
three times his average weekly wage or three hundred sixty dollars,
whichever is less, except for purposes of division
(D)(2)(c) of this section, such term means the full period
of unemployment next ensuing after a separation from such work and
until such individual has become reemployed subject to the
terms set forth above, and has earned
wages equal to one half of his average weekly wage or
sixty dollars, whichever is less * * *." (Emphasis
added.)
The first step a person must take in order to end the "duration
of his unemployment" and thus requalify for benefits in Ohio is to
"become reemployed in employment [which is] subject to" certain
stated requirements.
By the terms of subsection (G), a person may become reemployed
in employment subject either to :(1) Ohio's unemployment compensation
Act (R. C. 4141.01 to 4141.46); (2) the unemployment compensation
Act of another state; or (3) of the United States.
In those cases not involving
R. C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c), {*436} in addition to becoming
reemployed in employment subject to one of these three provisions,
a person must also: (1) work six weeks; and (2) earn wages equal to
three times his average weekly wage or $360, whichever is less.
These requirements, however, are specifically excepted when R. C.
4141.29(D)(2)(c) is applicable.
Appellant concedes that the
language of subsection (G) (which precedes the [D][2][c] exception
language) requiring the earning of wages "equal to three times his
average weekly wage or three hundred sixty dollars, whichever is
less" has no application herein. It is asserted, however, that the
language "until such individual has worked six weeks" (also
preceding the exception) is applicable. This contention is based
upon the language (following the exception) which, in effect,
continues the duration of his unemployment "until such individual
has become reemployed subject to the terms set forth above." It is
asserted that the reference to working six weeks is one of the
"terms set forth above."
We reject that contention. We
think it clear that the "terms set forth above," as applied to the
time when an individual has become reemployed,
necessarily has reference only to those terms limiting the
employment as being an employment subject either to the Ohio Act,
the unemployment compensation Act of another state or of the United
States.*
In such cases the only
additional requirement to "becoming reemployed in employment
subject to" one of the three provisos, is the requirement that a
person must earn "wages equal to one half of his average weekly
wage or sixty dollars, whichever is less * * *."
It is conceded that Rainear
did become reemployed {*437} in employment which is
subject to the unemployment compensation act of Michigan. There is
no dispute as to the fact that Rainear, while so employed, did earn
in excess of $60. Thus, by the terms of R. C. 4141.29(G), Rainear
ended the "duration of * * * [her] unemployment" and became
eligible for benefits in Ohio.
This court's holding may
appear anomalous in that, if Rainear, subsequent to the termination
of her employment by appellant as a fulltime teacher, had been
employed only as a substitute teacher in Ohio, instead of Michigan,
she would not have been entitled to benefits under Ohio law. Prior
to January 1, 1978, R. C. 4141.01(B) read, in pertinent
part:
"(2) 'Employment'
includes:
"(a) * * *
"(i) * * * except for service
performed as a substitute teacher employed by a public school
district pursuant to section 3319.10 of the Revised
Code."
Had the substitute teaching
been done in Ohio, Rainear would not have been reemployed under the
Ohio Act. It is conceded, however, that the Michigan Act contains
no such provision.
Although it is doubtful that
the General Assembly actually envisioned such a seemingly anomalous
result, the duty of this court is simply to apply the terms of the
statute to the undisputed facts herein. Thus, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals upholding the allowance of Rainear's claim for
benefits is affirmed.
Judgment
affirmed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment
affirmed.
OPINION
FOOTNOTES
* The question of whether Rainear's termination of employment with
appellant would otherwise have been considered "involuntary
unemployment" within the purview of R. C. 4141.29 in the absence of
the provisions of subsection (D)(2)(c) was not raised either in the
lower courts or in this court. Thus no consideration is given
herein to such question.