WILLIAM E. COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant

vs.

OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

C.A. No. 9063
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, SUMMIT COUNTY
Slip Opinion
February 14, 1979

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO, CASE NO. CV 78 5 0908

 COUNSEL

 

Thomas L. Jacobs, and Russell S. Bensing, Attorneys at Law, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Gene Shackle, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant-Appellee

 JUDGES

 

VICTOR, J., BELL, P.J., LYNCH, J., CONCURS (Lynch, J., Judge of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to Article IV, § 5(A)(3), Constitution).
 AUTHOR: VICTOR

 OPINION

 

 

 
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

 

VICTOR, J.

 

This cause was heard January 17, 1979, upon the record in the trial court, and the briefs. It was argued by counsel for the parties and submitted to the court. We have reviewed each assignment of error and make the following disposition:

 

This is an appeal from a denial of unemployment compensation benefits.

 

The claimant, appellant, William E. Cooper, was employed by ARDC Technical Specialist, Inc. for several months during 1977. He voluntarily quit this job to take a higher paying job with TAD Technical Services Corporation (TAD).

 

Appellant was promised that the position with TAD would be for a minimum duration of one year, but because the scope of the job to which he was assigned was substantially changed, he was laid off for lack of work one week after commencing work.

 

After Cooper's claim for unemployment benefits was denied administratively, he filed an appeal with the Common Pleas Court of Summit County which affirmed the denial. In this appeal Cooper says:

 

"The lower court's finding that claimant was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, by virtue of R.C. Sec. 4141.291(A), since he did not work at least three (3) weeks in his new employment after leaving his former employment, is contrary to law, since the aforesaid provision, in its application to claimant, is arbitrary, capricious, and irrational, in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

 

R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) provides that no one may be paid unemployment benefits for the duration of his unemployment if it is determined he quit his work without just cause. The section then provides that:

 

"* * * division (D)(2) * * * does not apply to the separation of a person * * *."

 

who

 

"(iii) * * * has left his employment * * * to accept other employment as provided under section 4141.291 of the Revised Code, * * *."

 

R.C. 4141.291 provides in part:

 

"(A) Notwithstanding section 4141.29, of the Revised Code, an individual who voluntarily quits his work * * * to accept other employment subject to sections 4141.01 to 4141.46, inclusive, of the Revised Code, * * * commences such employment within seven calendar days, and in such other employment works three weeks and earns wages equal to one and one-half times his average weekly wage or one hundred eighty dollars, whichever is less, shall remove the disqualification imposed by division (D)(2)(a) of section 4141.29 of the Revised Code and shall be deemed to have fully complied with division (G) of such section."

 

"* * *."

 

Division (G) defines the duration of the person's unemployment and, in essence, provides that, when one's duration of unemployment is ended, one may again become eligible for benefits.

 

Two Ohio Courts of Appeal have held that quitting one job to take a higher paying job is a quit without just cause. They reasoned that the purpose of the law providing unemployment benefits was to provide economic relief to those who became unemployed involuntarily. Thus, quitting to take another job was a voluntary act not connected with the work and would shift the results of the employee's risk upon an innocent employer. We agree with those cases. See, Hippert v. Bd. of Review, Stark No. 4771 (5th Dist. Ct. App., February 25, 1978) 1B CCH Unemployment Insurance Reports, Ohio P9193; Nagle v. Bd. of Review, Mahoning No. 78-120 (7th Dist. Ct. App., January 4, 1979).

 

Thus, Cooper was denied benefits not because of any requirements of R.C. 4141.291, but because he quit work without just cause. Actually, R.C. 4141.291 provides the means whereby one who has quit without just cause may remove the disability and qualify for benefits.

 

Cooper has not been denied the equal protection of the laws. All employees who quit without just cause are treated alike. All are denied benefits for the duration of their unemployment until such time that they become re-employed in employment subject to the stated requirements of R.C. 4141.291. Compare, Fulton County Bd. of Edn. v. Giles, 56 Ohio St. 2d 433 (1978).

 

The three week requirement is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. It reasonably relates to the state's interest by insuring that employees with stable employment obtain new employment of such certainty so as to justify the employee to quit one job to take another. The legislation, thus, promotes a legitimate state of interest.

 

We overrule the assignment of error and affirm the judgment.

 

-

 

The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 

We order that a special mandate, directing the Summit County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution, shall issue out of this court. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.

 

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E).

 

Costs taxed to appellant.

 

Exceptions.