WILLIAM E. COOPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
C.A. No. 9063
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, SUMMIT
COUNTY
Slip Opinion
February 14, 1979
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE
COMMON PLEAS COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO, CASE NO. CV 78 5 0908
COUNSEL
Thomas L. Jacobs, and Russell S. Bensing, Attorneys at Law, for
Plaintiff-Appellant
Gene Shackle, Assistant Attorney General, for
Defendant-Appellee
JUDGES
VICTOR, J., BELL, P.J., LYNCH, J., CONCURS (Lynch, J., Judge of the
Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant
to Article IV, § 5(A)(3), Constitution).
AUTHOR: VICTOR
OPINION
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
VICTOR, J.
This cause was heard January 17, 1979, upon the record in the
trial court, and the briefs. It was argued by counsel for the
parties and submitted to the court. We have reviewed each
assignment of error and make the following disposition:
This is an appeal from a denial of unemployment compensation
benefits.
The claimant, appellant, William E. Cooper, was employed by ARDC
Technical Specialist, Inc. for several months during 1977. He
voluntarily quit this job to take a higher paying job with TAD
Technical Services Corporation (TAD).
Appellant was promised that the position with TAD would be for a
minimum duration of one year, but because the scope of the job to
which he was assigned was substantially changed, he was laid off
for lack of work one week after commencing work.
After Cooper's claim for unemployment benefits was denied
administratively, he filed an appeal with the Common Pleas Court of
Summit County which affirmed the denial. In this appeal Cooper
says:
"The lower court's finding that claimant was not entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits, by virtue of R.C. Sec.
4141.291(A), since he did not work at least three (3) weeks in his
new employment after leaving his former employment, is contrary to
law, since the aforesaid provision, in its application to claimant,
is arbitrary, capricious, and irrational, in violation of Article
I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, and of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) provides that no one may be paid
unemployment benefits for the duration of his unemployment if it is
determined he quit his work without just cause. The section then
provides that:
"* * * division (D)(2) * * * does not apply to the separation of
a person * * *."
who
"(iii) * * * has left his employment * * * to accept other
employment as provided under section 4141.291 of the Revised Code,
* * *."
R.C. 4141.291 provides in part:
"(A) Notwithstanding section 4141.29, of the Revised Code, an
individual who voluntarily quits his work * * * to accept other
employment subject to sections 4141.01 to 4141.46, inclusive, of
the Revised Code, * * * commences such employment within seven
calendar days, and in such other employment works three weeks and
earns wages equal to one and one-half times his average weekly wage
or one hundred eighty dollars, whichever is less, shall remove the
disqualification imposed by division (D)(2)(a) of section 4141.29
of the Revised Code and shall be deemed to have fully complied with
division (G) of such section."
"* * *."
Division (G) defines the duration of the person's unemployment
and, in essence, provides that, when one's duration of unemployment
is ended, one may again become eligible for benefits.
Two Ohio Courts of Appeal have held that quitting one job to
take a higher paying job is a quit without just cause. They
reasoned that the purpose of the law providing unemployment
benefits was to provide economic relief to those who became
unemployed involuntarily. Thus, quitting to take another job was a
voluntary act not connected with the work and would shift the
results of the employee's risk upon an innocent employer. We agree
with those cases. See, Hippert v. Bd. of Review, Stark No. 4771
(5th Dist. Ct. App., February 25, 1978) 1B CCH Unemployment
Insurance Reports, Ohio P9193; Nagle v. Bd. of Review, Mahoning No.
78-120 (7th Dist. Ct. App., January 4, 1979).
Thus, Cooper was denied benefits not because of any requirements
of R.C. 4141.291, but because he quit work without just cause.
Actually, R.C. 4141.291 provides the means whereby one who has quit
without just cause may remove the disability and qualify for
benefits.
Cooper has not been denied the equal protection of the laws. All
employees who quit without just cause are treated alike. All are
denied benefits for the duration of their unemployment until such
time that they become re-employed in employment subject to the
stated requirements of R.C. 4141.291. Compare, Fulton County Bd. of
Edn. v. Giles, 56 Ohio St. 2d 433 (1978).
The three week requirement is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable. It reasonably relates to the state's interest by
insuring that employees with stable employment obtain new
employment of such certainty so as to justify the employee to quit
one job to take another. The legislation, thus, promotes a
legitimate state of interest.
We overrule the assignment of error and affirm the judgment.
-
The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
We order that a special mandate, directing the Summit County
Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution, shall
issue out of this court. A certified copy of this journal entry
shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall
constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file
stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E).
Costs taxed to appellant.
Exceptions.