UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO,
APPELLEE,
vs.
HEINY; ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT
SERVICES
ET AL., APPELLANTS
No. 86-1149
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
30 Ohio St.3d 143, 30 Ohio B. Rep. 454, 507 N.E.2d
1130
May 20, 1987, Decided
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals forLucasCounty.
HEADNOTE
Unemployment compensation -- Benefits denied to employees of
educational institutions during periods of summer months, when --
R.C. 4141.29 (I)(1)(b) -- Reasonable assurance of available
employment in following academic year.
SYLLABUS
R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(b) denies unemployment benefits for the period
during the summer months to employees of educational institutions
who work in other than instructional, research or principal
administrative capacities, when such employees are given reasonable
assurance in the current academic year that employment is available
for the following academic year.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This cause arises as a result of the filing of an application for
unemployment benefits by claimant, Betty L. Heiny, in June 1984.
Heiny has been employed by the appellee,UniversityofToledo, as a
part-time shuttle bus driver since September 1970. During such
employment, Heiny and other drivers have operated the shuttle
system from the beginning of the fall quarter in late September
through the end of the Spring quarter in mid-June. While
approximately thirty-five drivers are needed through the fall,
winter and spring quarters, only five or six college work-study
students operate the shuttle system in the summer quarter because
the activities and enrollment at the school are drastically
reduced.
OnMay 21, 1984, Heiny received an interoffice memorandum
from appellee's Work Control Department which stated:
"This is a reminder that, as in prior years, your last day of work
as a part-time shuttle bus driver (SOC 113) for this academic year
will beFriday, June 15,
1984.
"We will expect you to report to work again for the 1984/85
academic year, beginning with open registration for fall quarter
onThursday, September 20,
1984at8:00 a.m."
Heiny notified appellee that she was willing to work the summer
quarter and then filed her application for unemployment benefits
for the week endingJune 23,
1984. OnJuly 11, 1984, appellant Administrator of the Ohio Bureau
of Employment Services denied Heiny's request for benefits.
The administrator's decision was affirmed in a decision on
reconsideration dated August 8, 1984, which stated in part: "* * *
[C]laimant was separated by [the] University of Toledo due to lack
of work on June 15, 1984, the end of the academic year or term and
* * * claimant had a contract or reasonable assurance of employment
with an educational institution or an institution of higher
education in a nonprofessional capacity for the next academic year
or term. Claim for the week endingJune 23, 1984was disallowed as a waiting week because it
was a week of unemployment which began during the period between
two successive academic years or terms." Heiny then appealed to
appellant, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (hereinafter
"the board"). An evidentiary hearing was held onSeptember 4, 1984, before a referee for the board. OnSeptember 10, 1984, the referee determined that Heiny was
eligible for benefits. An application to institute a further appeal
before the full board was filed by appellee but was
disallowed.
The matter was timely appealed by appellee to the court of common
pleas, which affirmed the decision of the board.
The court of appeals held that Heiny was not entitled to benefits
and reversed the decision of the trial court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a
motion to certify the record.
COUNSEL
Spengler, Nathanson, Heyman, McCarthy & Durfee and James P.
Triona, for appellee.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, Patrick A. Devine and
John F. Kozlowski, for appellants.
JUDGES
LOCHER, J. MOYER, C.J., HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ.,
concur. SWEENEY, J., dissents.
AUTHOR: LOCHER
OPINION
The issue presented in this action is whether the claimant was
entitled to unemployment benefits. We hold in the negative.
The resolution of this controversy rests upon an interpretation of
R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(b). This section provides:
"Benefits based on service for an educational institution or an
institution of higher education in other than an instructional,
research, or principal {*145} administrative capacity, shall not be
paid to any individual for any week of unemployment which begins
during the period between two successive academic years or terms of
the employing educational institution or institution of higher
education provided the individual performed such services for the
educational institution or institution of higher education during
the first such academic year or term and, there is a reasonable
assurance that such individual will perform such services for any
educational institution or institution of higher education in the
second of such academic years or terms." [FN1] (Emphasis
added.)
Specifically, we must determine the intent of the legislature in
its use of the phrase "academic years or terms" within the overall
context of the statute.
Appellants argue in support of the interpretation given by the
board in its decision. The board determined that "* * * the
claimant's benefits are based on service for an educational
institution -- an institution of higher education and that she was
employed in a position other than an instructional, research or
principal administrative capacity. The facts further show that the
week endingJune 23,
1984, was a week which began
between two successive academic terms. The claimant did not receive
any reasonable assurance that she would be performing work services
for any educational institution during the summer quarter. Thus,
the claimant had no reasonable assurance that she would be
performing such services for any educational institution in the
second of such academic terms. * * * Therefore, the claimant has
fulfilled all of the eligibility requirements for filing a valid
weekly claim for benefits, and the claim for the week ending June
23, 1984 must be allowed." The trial court upheld this
determination, finding that it was not unlawful, unreasonable or
against the manifest weight of the evidence pursuant to R.C.
4141.28(O).
We recognize that "* * * it is well-settled that courts, when
interpreting {*146} statutes, must give due deference to an
administrative interpretation formulated by an agency * * *."
State, ex rel.McLean, v. . Indus. Comm. (1986), 25OhioSt.3d
90, 92, 25 OBR 141, 143, 495 N.E.2d 370, 372. However, when an
agency's interpretation is unreasonable and thwarts the intent of
the legislature, it must be overturned.
We find the interpretation of R.C. 4141.29(I)(i)(b) espoused by
the court of appeals to be the proper interpretation and reject the
interpretation of the board as unreasonable and unlawful.
Unemployment compensation legislation has been enacted to benefit
teachers and non-instructional employees of educational
institutions whose employment has terminated at the end of an
academic year and whose employment prospects for the ensuing
academic year are doubtful. It surely was not enacted to "subsidize
the vacation periods of those who know well in advance that they
may be laid off for certain specified periods."Davisv. .
Commonwealth (1978), 39Pa.Commw.
146, 147, 394 A. 2d 1320, 1321. "'In effect what the * * *
[employee] in this case [is] requesting is that the government
should provide * * * [her] with a full year's income because * * *
[she has] agreed to work and be paid for only 44 weeks of each
year.'" Citing Chickey v. . Commonwealth (1975), 16 Pa. Commw. 485,
494, 332 A. 2d 853, 857.
In the case sub judice, the claimant had been employed by appellee
since 1970 and had full knowledge that her services would not be
required during the summer months when classes and activities are
substantially curtailed. Moreover, the claimant concededly had a
reasonable assurance of continued employment. Her employment for
the fall of 1984 was never in doubt. She was fully expected to
report for work for the 1984-1985 academic year beginning in
September 1984. We believe that the legislature intended to deny
benefits to such an employee when it enacted R.C.
4141.29(I)(1)(b).
We therefore hold that R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(b) denies unemployment
benefits for the period during the summer months to employees of
educational institutions who work in other than instructional,
research or principal administrative capacities, when such
employees are given reasonable assurance in the current academic
year that employment is available for the following academic year.
An academic year is generally recognized to consist of the fall,
winter and spring sessions of an educational institution. We do not
stand alone in this interpretation. See Dowdy v. . Dist. of
Columbia Dept. of Emp. Serv. (D.C. App. 1986), 515 A. 2d 399;
Friedlander v. . Emp. Div. (1984), 66 Ore. App. 546, 676 P. 2d 314;
and Claim of Lintz (1982), 89 App. Div. 2d 1038, 454 N.Y. Supp. 2d
346. The claimant herein was employed by an educational institution
in other than an instructional, research or principal
administrative capacity and was given reasonable assurance at the
end of the 1983-1984 academic year that employment was available
for the 1984-1985 academic year.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the claimant was not
entitled {*147} to unemployment benefits and, accordingly, affirm
the decision of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
DISSENT
SWEENEY, J., dissenting.
Given the remedial nature of the unemployment compensation
statutes, I believe that the board of review and the trial court
below correctly interpreted R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(b) so as to allow
claimant to receive unemployment benefits during the time she is
laid off during the summer. Therefore, I must dissent from the
majority's decision holding otherwise.
In the cause sub judice, the record reveals that there are
part-time bus driver positions available during the summer term,
albeit on a reduced scale, but that such positions are regularly
filled by students. In view of the applicable law, I believe that
the university must either hire the regular bus drivers during the
summer or pay unemployment benefits to those employees during the
summer term.
In addition, I am troubled by the majority's determination that
the academic year at the University of Toledo excludes the summer
term. The facts developed below indicate clearly that the
university operates on a year-round basis, both academically and
administratively. In my view, the majority's exclusion of the
summer term from the academic year defies reality. While the
appellee-university operates on a somewhat reduced scale during the
summer months, the fact remains that the university does offer
courses, provide services and grant degrees to students during the
summer term. Perhaps during a bygone era a university did close up
during the summer; however, today's universities operate on a
year-round basis, and the majority's decision to the contrary is,
in a word, unpersuasive.
A review of the statute in issue indicates use of the language
"academic year or term." (Emphasis added.) I believe that a
rational construction of this statutory language permits the award
of unemployment benefits to the claimant. Since unemployment
compensation laws are remedial in nature, a liberal construction of
the statutory language mandates the award of benefits to the
claimant.
Since I am of the opinion that the board of review and trial court
made the correct interpretation of the applicable law, I would
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the
decision rendered by the Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 This section was apparently based upon the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act, Section 3301, Title 26, U.S. Code. By adopting and
maintaining an unemployment program which closely conforms to the
criteria established in the Act, states can qualify for federal
subsidies and the employers within the states can qualify for tax
credits. The pertinent section of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
is Section 3304(a)(6)(A)(ii), Title 26, U.S. Code, which
provides:
"Compensation is payable on the basis of service to which section
3309(a)(1) applies, in the same amount, on the same terms, and
subject to the same conditions as compensation payable on the basis
of other service subject to such law; except that --
"* * *
"(ii) with respect to services in any other capacity for an
educational institution to which section 309(a)(1) applies --
"(I) compensation payable on the basis of such services shall be
denied to any individual for any week which commences during a
period between 2 successive academic years or terms if such
individual performs such services in the first of such academic
years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such
individual will perform such services in the second of such
academic years or terms * * *."