Regina M. Parks,
Appellant-Appellee,
vs.
Health One, Appellee-Appellee, Administrator, Ohio
Bureau
of Employment Services,
Appellee-Appellant
No. 88AP-982
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT,
FRANKLIN COUNTY
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 3118
August 8, 1989, Decided
APPEAL from theFranklinCountyCourt of Common Pleas.
COUNSEL
EVANS, ST. CLAIR & KELSEY, and MR. PAUL M. AUCOIN, for appellee
Regina Parks.
BAKER & HOSTETLER, and MR. MICHAEL ASENSIO, for appellee Health
One.
MR. ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE, JR., Attorney General, and MS. SONYA M.
JONES, for appellant.
JUDGES
YOUNG, J., STRAUSBAUGH and WHITESIDE, JJ., concur.
AUTHOR: YOUNG
OPINION
DECISION
YOUNG, J.
This matter is before this court upon the appeal of the Ohio Bureau
of Employment Services (O.B.E.S.), appellant, from a judgment of
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas which remanded the cause
to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review ("board of
review") for a determination of "just cause" pursuant to R.C.
4141.29(D)(2)(a) Appellee, Regina Parks ("Parks"), was employed as
a physical therapist by appellee, Health One, from 1982 through
June 1985. During that time, she became chief of the physical
therapy department. She eventually resigned as the department
chief, but remained in the department working as a physical
therapist. OnJune 7,
1985, Parks received a letter
from her employer stating that she had been placed on a thirty-day
probationary period due to her job performance. Shortly thereafter,
she met with Dr. C.R. Block, the acting executive director, for an
explanation as to why she had been placed on probationary status.
Parks than consulted an attorney. The attorney contacted Dr. Block
and was told that Health One intended to discharge Parks at the end
of her probationary period. Thereafter, Parks sent a letter of
resignation to Dr. Block.
In February 1986, Parks filed an application for unemployment
compensation with O.B.E.S. The O.B.E.S. denied Parks' application
for benefits upon the basis that she had quit her employment
without just cause. Based on a timely appeal to the board of
review, the administrative referee affirmed the denial of benefits
to Parks. After exhausting all her administrative remedies, Parks
filed an appeal to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The
trial court remanded the cause for a determination as to whether
Parks quit her job for "just cause" pursuant to R C.
4141.29(D)(2)(a).
Appellant, O.B.E.S., now asserts the following two assignments of
error:
"I. THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REMANDING THE INSTANT
CASE BACK FOR DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE COULD
HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE: THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINATION
OF ENTITLEMENT TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS UPON VOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT IS JUST CAUSE TO QUIT.
"II. THE DECISION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW
WAS LAWFUL, REASONABLE AND SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE, WHERE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE APPELLEE QUIT HER JOB
IN ANTICIPATION OF BEING DISCHARGED, PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF A
THIRTY DAY PROBATIONARY PERIOD TO IMPROVE HER PERFORMANCE."
In the first assignment of error, O.B.E.S. asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion by ordering that the case be remanded
to the board of review for a determination as to whether Parks quit
her job for "just cause" pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) O.B.E.S.
argues that the trial court was limited in its review to the extent
that it could only make a determination as to whether the board of
review abused its discretion. Furthermore, O.B.E.S. asserts that
the trial court could only determine whether the decision of the
board of review was lawful, reasonable, and supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence, pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O).
R.C. 4141.28(O) states, in pertinent part:
"* * * If the court finds that the decision was unlawful,
unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it
shall reverse and vacate such decision or it may modify such
decision and enter final judgment in accordance with such
modification; otherwise such court shall affirm such decision. * *
*"
This statute provides to the court only three alternatives for
disposing of an appeal from the O.B.E.S. board of review: the court
of common pleas can either (1) affirm; (2) reverse and vacate; or
(3) modify and enter final judgment. However, case law sets forth
that the power to reverse and vacate decisions necessarily includes
the power to remand the cause to the originating decision maker.
Superior Metal Products v. Admr., Bur. of Employment Services
(1975), 41OhioSt.2d 143. Therefore, the remand effectuates
the jurisdiction of the O.B.E.S. to conduct further proceedings and
to render a new decision.
In the facts before this court, the trial court could not reach a
decision whether to affirm or reverse the decision of the board of
review since it made no decision regarding the evidence before it
on the issue of "just cause." Thus, the issue was not one of
"manifest weight of the evidence" but rather a failure of the board
of review to make a specific finding regarding the issue of "just
cause" based on the evidence before it. Accordingly, the trial
court was vested with the power to remand the cause herein to the
board of review for the purpose of resolving the issue of "just
cause" and properly did so in the interest of justice so that
ultimately, a fair and lawful decision could be reached.
Appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken and is
overruled.
In the second assignment of error, O.B.E.S. asserts that the
decision of the board of review is lawful and reasonable and
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. O.B.E.S. contends
that it properly denied Parks unemployment compensation benefits on
the basis that Parks quit her job in anticipation of being
discharged and that the issue of whether a possible discharge would
have been for "just cause" pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) was
not applicable to the issues in this case. The facts before this
court are uncontroverted that the only reason Parks quit her job
was in anticipation of being discharged. The referee's findings of
fact show that Parks quit her job only after her employer told her
attorney that Health One intended to terminate her employment
irrespective of her job performance throughout the remainder of her
probationary period. Thus, the question remaining was whether the
employer was justified in its decision to terminate Parks.
The referee's finding that Parks' resignation was without "just
cause" seems to be predicated on the notion that Parks was required
to work through to the end of her probationary, endure all the
technicalities of termination, and go through all of the motions of
being discharged from her employment. The referee also pointed out
that the employer had the prerogative of changing its mind
regarding Parks' termination during the remainder of the
probationary period. However, this court is not aware of any
requirement that an employee remain on the job, in a highly
stressful situation, when a discharge from the employment is
inevitable.
For unemployment compensation purposes, an employer who resigns in
anticipation of being discharged must be judged by the same
criteria as if the discharge had actually taken place. See Watters
v. City of Upper Arlington (Mar. 16, 1982), Franklin App. No.
81AP-778, unreported (1982 Opinions 617). Thus, the issue as to
whether Parks quit her job with or without just cause, as defined
in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), has not yet been determined by the board
of review even though the board had before it sufficient evidence
on this issue to make an informed decision regarding Parks' request
for benefits.
R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) provides that an employee is not entitled to
unemployment benefits if "[h]e quit his work without just cause or
has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work. * *
*" "Just cause" has been defined as "* * * '* * * that which, to an
ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or
not doing a particular act. '* * * Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Review (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, citing Peyton v. Sun T.V.
(1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12. The board of review had evidence
before it regarding the issue of whether Parks' inevitable
discharge would have been based on "just cause," but did not make a
determination on this specific issue. Thus, the issue which is
unresolved is whether Parks' discharge would have been based on
"just cause" within the meaning of the statutory language.
Accordingly, this cause must necessarily be remanded to the board
of review to make that determination and the trial court's order of
remand was proper.
Based on the foregoing analysis, appellant's first and second
assignments of error are not well-taken and are overruled. The
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.