VINSON,
appellant,
vs.
AARP FOUNDATION, Appellee.
No. 98AP-110.
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT,
FRANKLIN COUNTY
134 Ohio App.3d 176, 730 N.E.2d 479, 1999 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4484
September 28, 1999, Decided.
COUNSEL
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley and Frederic A
Portman, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Patricia V. Hoskins,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
JUDGES
BRYANT, DESHLER, and TYACK, JJ.
AUTHOR: PEGGY BRYANT, Judge.
OPINION
Appellant, Eileen Vinson, appeals from a judgment of. the Franklin
County Common Pleas Court, which affirmed a decision of the Ohio
Unemployment Review Commission ("commission") denying her
unemployment compensation benefits.
Appellant began working for appellee, AARP Foundation ("AARP") in
March 1996. She continued working there until August 9, 1996, when
she left to begin a new job as a receptionist at Faith Mission. She
worked at Faith Mission from August 12, 1996 to November 1, 1996,
when she separated from her employment, allegedly for improperly
taking a telephone message.
On November 18, 1996, appellant applied for unemployment benefits.
Because Faith Mission is a noncovered employer, appellant's
employment with AARP was considered in determining her eligibility
for benefits. An initial determination from the administrator of
the Ohio Bureau Employment Services found that appellant had quit
her job with AARP without just cause and was not entitled to
benefits. Appellant appealed the decision, affirmed on
reconsideration, to the commission. A hearing was held on March 11,
1997, at which both appellant and AAR.P were represented by
counsel. After the hearing, the board affirmed the administrator's
reconsidered decision that appellant had quit her job without just
cause. The commission disallowed appellant's subsequent application
to institute a further appeal. On appeal to the Franklin County
Common Pleas Court, that court affirmed the commission's decision
to deny benefits.
Appellant timely appeals, assigning the following error:
"The trial court erred when it found that appellant quit employment
without just cause."
While a reviewing court in cases of this nature is not permitted to
make factual findings or to determine the credibility of witnesses,
it has the duty to determine whether the board's decision is
supported by evidence in the record. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos
v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 653 N.E.2d
1207. Reviewing courts may reverse "just cause" decisions if they
are unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Id; R.C. 4141.28(O).
While an employee who quits work without just cause is not entitled
to unemployment compensation, an employee who quits work with just
cause is entitled to such benefits. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). "Just
cause" has been defined as "that which, to an ordinarily
intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing
a particular act." Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review (1985), 19
Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 19, 19 OBR 12, 14, 16, 482 N.E.2d 587, 589, 591,
citing Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12, 73 O.O.2d
8, 9, 335 N.E.2d 751, 752. Whether just cause exists depends on the
unique factual circumstances of the particular case. Id. The
claimant has the burden of proving entitlement to unemployment
compensation benefits under the statutory provisions, including the
existence of just cause for quitting work. Id.; Shannon v. Bur. of
Unemp. Comp. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 53, 44 O.O. 75, 97 N.E.2d
425.
Generally, an employee who terminates employment in order to accept
other employment quits without just cause and is not eligible for
unemployment benefits, even if the employee leaves for a better
paving job. Radcliffe v. Artrrnnick Internatl., Inc. (1987), 31
Ohio St.3d 40, 41, 31 OBR 148, 149-150, 508 N.E.2d 953, 954; see,
also, Cardani v. Olsten Home Healthcare (July 31, 1998), Tuscarawas
App. No. 97AP120083, unreported, 1998 WL 549374; Dickson v.
Thousand Trails Resorts (Nov. 7, 1988), Clinton App. No.
CA88--06-008, unreported, 1988 WL 120780; Cooper v. Ohio Bur. of
Emp. Serv. (Feb. 14, 1979), Summit App. No. CA9063, unreported.
But, see, Young v. Tortilla Flats (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 41, 523
N.E.2d 519 (deciding the issue prior to the opinion in Radcliffe,
supra ).
Agreeing generally that an employee who quits to accept a better
job quits without just cause, appellant nonetheless contends that
her case is distinguishable because her job at AARP was intended to
facilitate her finding another job elsewhere. Indeed, her
enrollment agreement with AARP specifically stated that the program
was for the "basic purpose of helping [her] to prepare for work."
Appellant thus asserts that quitting her job at AARP was the
fulfillment of her goals, and was done with just cause.
While the legislature has created some exceptions that alleviate
the disqualification caused by quitting without just cause, see
R.C. 4141.291, it has not enacted an exception encompassing
appellant's argument. See, also, Radcliffe, supra. Until the
legislature creates such an exception, this court is constrained by
the choices the legislature currently has made. Contrary to
appellant's argument, the statutory provisions do not allow a "job
training" exception to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). See Nagle v. Bd. of
Review (Jan. 4, 1979), Mahoning App. No. 78-C.A.-120, unreported
(holding that "the question of whether a person who quits his or
her job to obtain a better paying job which does not materialize is
entitled to unemployment benefits is a policy making decision that
is within the jurisdiction of the state legislature").
Accordingly, because appellant quit her job with AARP to accept a
better paying job, she quit without just cause. Pursuant to R.C.
4141.29(D)(2)(a), she is disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits. Accordingly, appellant's single assignment of error is
overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DESHLER, J., concurs.
TYACK, J., dissents.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
DISSENT
TYACK, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
HARP Foundation does vocational training. The whole purpose of AARP
Foundation's efforts is to help people resume unsubsidized
employment. Both A.4RP Foundation and the individuals it assists
view- a transition to regular employment as a success. Thus, an
individual does not really quit employment with AARP Foundation any
more than a person quits college when the person graduates. The
goal has been obtained and the person's activity is modified.
Under the circumstances, I believe that Vinson modified her
employment status with just cause. She achieved the goal being
sought both by her and by AARP Foundation. She should not be
punished by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services for taking
regular employment after completing job training. Indeed, the irony
that a so-called "bureau of employment services" will deprive a
person of benefits because the person successfully completed an
employment training effort is truly striking.
Because I believe that Vinson modified her employment status with
AARP Foundation with just cause, I would grant, her unemployment
benefits. The majority of this panel reaches a different result. I,
therefore, dissent.